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I analyze how various aspects of diversity impact new venture performance. In the 
first study, I find that credit riskiness and assets of a venture mediate the gap in 
performance, revenues and profits between Black and White owned ventures. In my second 
study, I examine diversity in same industry work experience and education. I find that same 
industry work experience diversity has no impact on venture survival but level of 
educational diversity has a non-monotonic effect on survival. Finally, in the third study, I 
find that use of adequate controls leads to no gap in performance between male versus 
female-owned ventures. However, certain owner characteristics such as same industry 
work experience and number of hours worked and venture level characteristics such as 
technology level and incorporation status lead to significant gaps in survival, revenues and 
profits between male and female-owned ventures. I utilize the confidential Kauffman Firm 
Survey, an extensive dataset of new ventures started in 2004 in the US and tracked till 
2011, to conduct the analyses. I discuss implications of my findings for research, investors 
and entrepreneurs.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Entrepreneurship is receiving increased attention from scholars and policy makers 
and much research has been done but there are still many open questions. My research 
agenda in entrepreneurship has an empirical focus. I study the role of diversity in 
demographics and human capital at the venture owner team level and its impact on new 
venture survival and performance. I focus on three dimensions of diversity – racial, work 
experience & education, and finally gender. Under the general theme of diversity, I focus 
on three primary research questions.  
1. What mechanisms induce the difference in performance between Black and 
White owned ventures? 
2. Is degree attainment of the owner team a predictor of new venture survival? 
Does diversity in work experience and education of the owner team impact its survival? 
3. Are there endowment or other differences between male vs female-owned 
ventures, even though there are no differences in venture outcomes of the two groups? 
I address these questions in several chapters of my dissertation. In the following, I 
provide a brief overview of each chapter. 
The second chapter of my dissertation, “Black vs White owned new venture 
performance: A study of mediating effects”, analyzes the mechanisms that lead to 
differences in performance between Black and White owned ventures. Past studies show 
that Black ventures underperform White ventures, however they primarily focus on 
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individual owners and their characteristics. In my study, I utilize venture level constructs 
and focus on variables both external and internal to a venture. I study the role of three 
mediating mechanisms (a) demographic characteristics of a venture’s location (b) venture’s 
financial size (c) venture’s credit riskiness. Location has been shown to affect ventures 
because of agglomeration, social networks and nearness to consumer base amongst other 
reasons. If location mediates the performance gap a more macro level integrated approach 
would have to be adopted to rejuvenate underprivileged (usually Black) neighborhoods. 
However, if this is not the case, more micro level intervention would be useful in narrowing 
the gap. The financial size of a venture acts as a buffer while a venture is trying to come to 
terms with the environment and getting over the ‘liability of newness’. Similarly, the credit 
riskiness of a venture plays a pivotal role in its access to resources. Thus, it is important to 
study these mechanisms.  
I utilize the confidential Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS) panel dataset from 2004 to 
2011 to empirically test the above propositions. The dataset is unique on a few counts. KFS 
is representative of the new ventures started in the US in 2004, hence has general 
applicability. Most past studies observe ventures after they have attained a particular size 
or age, whereas KFS studies the 2004 cohort of ventures from inception. Thus, I can 
analyze truly nascent ventures. The geo coded nature of the data makes the location level 
analysis possible. Finally, detailed and granular information about the owners and venture 
financials provide adequate controls, thus alleviating endogeneity concerns. I find that 
location of a venture does not mediate the relationship, thus indicating that a more micro 
level intervention may be required for reducing the performance gap. The financial size 
and credit riskiness of the venture, both partially mediate the performance gap between 
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White and Black ventures. Thus, policies that would lead to an increase in the financial 
size such as subsidized credit, or availability of infrastructure etc., and policies that would 
help Black businesses develop better credit scores, such as coaching on better business 
practices or a discount in credit scores, should help the Black business outcomes to match 
White businesses. 
In the third chapter, “Impact of owner team characteristics on new venture survival”, 
I analyze whether education and similar industry work experience of the owner team 
impacts new venture survival. I propose that same industry work experience and 
completion of a degree, over and above the years of education attained, impact new venture 
survival. Further, I utilize the typology developed by Harrison and Klein (2007) to analyze 
the impact of diversity in same industry work experience and education of the owner 
operator team on the survival prospects of new ventures. Utilizing the confidential 
Kauffman Firm Survey data, an 8 year panel of new ventures, similar to past studies, same 
industry work experience of owners positively impacts venture survival. Further, I find that 
it is the attainment of a degree and not the years of education that is correlated with venture 
survival. I also find that diversity in education reduces the probability of survival however, 
same industry work experience diversity has no such impact. Finally, educational diversity 
is correlated with survival non-monotonically.  I conclude with implications for application 
and avenues of future research. 
In the chapter four, “Gender Differences and New Venture Performance”, I compare 
the performance of female-owned ventures with male-owned ventures utilizing the 
confidential Kauffman Firm Survey data. Prior results are mixed with most studies showing 
female-owned ventures underperforming relative to male-owned ventures, however newer 
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studies with more extensive controls seem to find no difference in performance. I use 
regression and decomposition analysis, and find that there is no performance gap between 
male and female-owned ventures. However, owner characteristics such as work experience 
in similar industry, average hours worked and venture level characteristics such as 
technology level and incorporation status of the venture create a difference in performance 
of the two categories of ventures. These findings have implications for policy makers and 
entrepreneurs alike.  
 References 
Harrison, D. A., & Klein, K. J. (2007). What's the difference? Diversity constructs as 
separation, variety, or disparity in organizations. Academy of Management 





CHAPTER 2. BLACK VS WHITE OWNED NEW VENTURE 
PERFORMANCE: A STUDY OF MEDIATING EFFECTS1 
 Introduction 
 New ventures have been touted as engines of growth for the economy. It is argued 
that new ventures contribute significantly to job growth. Decker et al. (2014) report that 
startups account for 20% of gross US jobs created annually. Research on new venture 
performance has spanned a few decades. However, analysis of performance outcomes of 
minority owned businesses and minority self-employment activities has received relatively 
scant attention (Bates, 1997; Fairlie, 1999; Fairlie & Robb, 2007). Most studies find that 
Black owned ventures have worse performance outcomes than White owned ventures. The 
availability of Census and other comprehensive datasets – such as the Characteristics of 
Business Owners, the Survey of Minority and Women Owned Businesses, the Panel Study 
of Income Dynamics has led to a number of studies analyzing the reasons for differences 
in outcomes between ventures owned by various races with focus on the White and Black 
communities (Bates, 1997; Fairlie & Robb, 2007; Robb, 2002). These studies are necessary 
since entrepreneurship is a crucial alternative to a regular job for making a living and 
alleviating the socio-economic conditions of the Black community (Fairlie & Robb, 2007). 
Studies have shown that one of the reasons for upward economic mobility of immigrant 
minorities has been through their ownership of small businesses (Bonacich & Modell, 
1980; Light, 1972). Recent studies find that entrepreneurship aids in reducing the wealth 
disparity between Black and White households (Bradford, 2014) and Black entrepreneurs 
suffer lesser downward wealth mobility compared to Black workers (Bradford, 2003). 
                                                 
1 The author acknowledges the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation and the NORC Data Enclave for 
providing researcher support and access to the data used in this research. 
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 Business creation is being used as a tool by many state and federal governments to 
bridge the socio-economic gap between different races and also to get families out of 
welfare and unemployment insurance rolls (Fairlie & Robb, 2007). Hence, it is important 
to understand what mechanisms are inducing the performance gap between Black and 
White owned ventures. In this exploratory study, I expand the scope of previous studies by 
exploring mechanisms at multiple levels. First, I focus on the mediating role of external 
factors such as the demographics of the location of the venture. Although external variables 
are relatively difficult to alter, entrepreneurs possess the ability to ‘choose’ locations which 
are endowed with certain characteristics. Next, I analyze factors at the venture level. 
Resources at the disposal of a new venture play a pivotal role in its performance. I focus 
on two variables – assets of a venture and the credit riskiness. Finally, I analyze the role of 
individual characteristics of the owners consolidated at the owner team level. Most past 
studies focus on a primary owner and her individual characteristics to explain the 
performance gap. I consolidate the individual characteristics of the team of owners and 
examine whether results of past studies that focused on primary owners are also applicable 
at the venture owner team level.  
 Understanding the role played by the location of a venture in the differential success 
of Black and White ventures may have profound policy implications. The prior literature 
focuses on the social networks of founders, abundance of resources and consumers, and 
agglomeration economies at the location, and ties it to performance (Dahl & Sorenson, 
2012; Figueiredo et al., 2002; Florida, 1994; Marshall, 1920). Bates and Robb (2014b) 
report that small businesses serving minority clients face higher rates of closure and low 
profitability. If location is indeed a driver of success for a new venture, then it should be 
no surprise that more venture owners (both White and Black) want to set up shop in zip 
codes that are more favorable to new venture performance - the White majority areas, since 
Whites are known to possess better socio economic status than Blacks on average (Morgan, 
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2005; Western & Pettit, 2005)2. Furthermore, the flight of businesses from areas 
‘inhospitable’ to new ventures (usually Black majority neighborhoods) would leave such 
neighborhoods in a vicious self-perpetuating cycle of even more blight with symptoms 
such as fewer services and less local employment. Thus, the solution to such a problem 
would require a multi-dimensional and macro level approach to rejuvenating the areas. On 
the other hand, if I find that location is not a driver of differential success, then policy 
makers could focus on venture level characteristics, which can be addressed through more 
nuanced policy intervention. 
 The second mechanism I investigate is the financial size of a venture and its 
mediating effects. The size of established firms has been linked to survival and 
performance (Dunne et al., 1989; Evans, 1987). Although most studies focus on the number 
of employees as an indicator of size, I propose instead to analyze the impact of financial 
size. Financial size could be considered more fundamental than the human resource size, 
since the former can be utilized to attract the latter. Performance of a venture is tied to 
internal attributes such as its resources and capabilities (Wernerfelt, 1984). Financial size 
is a proxy for the resources a venture has at its disposal, it also acts as a buffer while the 
new venture is struggling with liability of newness. Consumers may also prefer to deal with 
a business that is strong and vibrant and might be in operation down the road if the product 
they bought needs repair, maintenance or add ons. Finally, a bigger resource base could 
lead to more service and product offerings leading to better revenues and hence 
performance. Thus, I explore the impact of financial size as a mediator.   
 The third mediator - a venture’s credit riskiness - is crucial for attracting resources. 
It is an indicator of the ability of the venture to acquire resources in the future. Performance 
of a venture is dependent on access to resources (Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Penrose, 
                                                 
2 There are exceptions to this approach for example some small businesses ‘choose’ to locate in high crime 
areas since surviving in such areas is one of their core capabilities (Bates & Robb, 2008). 
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1959; Peteraf, 1993; Wernerfelt, 1984). Suppliers, service providers and other members of 
the value chain might implicitly evaluate the prospects or riskiness of the venture before 
providing access to their resources or services to it (Stuart et al., 1999). Thus, I study the 
mediating role of a venture’s credit riskiness. 
 Understanding these mechanisms gains further salience in the context of minority 
owned ventures since it is crucial to understand how policy makers, investors and other 
stakeholders should intervene to help these ventures, in light of scarce availability of both 
human and financial resources.  
 This study is based on the Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS), a confidential eight year 
panel dataset of new ventures representative of the new venture landscape of the US 
economy. Most past studies, using Census or survey data are able to observe ventures when 
they reach a certain size or age, however KFS captures venture data for firms started in 
2004, from the inception stage. Hence I am able to conduct analyses on ventures from the 
nascent stage onwards. The dataset contains geo-coded data, which makes the analyses of 
location feasible. The abundance of variables in the dataset allows me to control for 
potential endogeneity issues. Since the data are exclusively based on new ventures (and do 
not utilize self-employment data as a proxy for entrepreneurship) and the variables capture 
data on the entire owner team, analysis using these fine-grained data can be conducted at 
the venture team level rather than restricting it to sole or primary owner.  
 The key findings of this study are that I do not find support for the mediating role 
of local demography in new venture performance. However, the financial size and credit 
riskiness of a venture mediate the relationship between race and performance. I use 
extensive controls and various other strategies detailed in the ‘Robustness and 
Endogeneity’ section to address endogeneity concerns. The structure of the paper is as 
follows – in the next section I discuss the theoretical underpinnings of the various 
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relationships described above. I follow up with a description of the data, variables used and 
research methods. Results are presented in the section after and I close with a discussion 
of the results. 
 Theory and Literature Review 
 New venture performance has been a topic of study both theoretically and 
empirically over the past few decades. Availability of longitudinal data was a major 
constraint in studying outcomes but new panel datasets have alleviated the issue to a certain 
extent. Sexton and Robinson (1989) were one of the first to study demographic variables 
such as age, education, race of owners and their correlation with survival and performance. 
Cooper et al. (1994) utilized a panel dataset which also represented a broader set of 
industries and thus was more representative of an economy, to analyze the impact of race 
on performance. They found that minority owned businesses perform worse than non-
minority owned ventures. Most previous studies account for race effects through two 
approaches. The older approach was to introduce a dummy variable for the race of the 
primary owner of the venture and interpret its coefficient, depending on the sign of the 
coefficient it was inferred whether race was systematically correlated with venture survival 
(Fairlie & Meyer, 1996). Newer studies (Fairlie, 2005a; Fairlie & Robb, 2007) conduct 
decomposition analyses wherein they calculate the contribution of endowments such as 
education, work experience etc. which explains the gap in performance metrics such as 
survival between White vs Black owned ventures. Most of these studies find that Black 
owned ventures fare much worse than White owned ventures on most measures of 
performance.   
 Multiple mechanisms were conjectured by studies for the poor performance of 
Blacks which included them possessing poor business contacts, poor location, more 
difficulty in obtaining insurance and credit, and access to 'desirable' customers. In the 
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following paragraphs, I explore the rationale of a few mechanisms that are the focus of this 
paper. 
2.2.1 Demographics of new venture location 
The decision about where to set up a business is crucial and difficult to change. It 
can have significant consequences for new venture survival and performance. The 
phenomenon that location of a business in an area which has other similar businesses has 
the possibility of enhancing the focal venture’s performance has been studied as far back 
as 1920 by Marshall (agglomeration economies). Other studies investigate the impact of 
output market characteristics in the decision to locate a venture. Woodward and Glickman 
(1991), Coughlin et al. (1991) and Florida (1994) show that foreign direct investment in 
manufacturing plants is attracted by states that have higher per capita incomes, higher 
density of manufacturing activity or higher concentration of upstream and downstream 
firms of the value chain.  
Studies also show that entrepreneurs prefer a location since they are socially 
embedded in the location and hence can benefit from the resources and infrastructure of 
the area (Dahl & Sorenson, 2012). They further posit that a pivotal question is not whether 
a location is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ for a business but rather – “given my resources, do I have the 
greatest odds of success.” Thus, studies focus on both the resource endowments of a 
location and which entrepreneur is able to capitalize on those endowments.  
Black dominated areas are known to possess fewer resources compared to White 
majority areas. Scarce availability of resources and infrastructure will adversely affect a 
new venture either by increasing the cost or decreasing the quality of services and products. 
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Similarly, a shallow or lower quality talent pool will also weigh down the performance of 
the venture. The income levels of the consumers are also lower in Black neighborhoods, 
further exacerbating the situation for a new venture in such areas. Given the above 
conditions, fewer owners would decide to locate their ventures in such areas than the ideal 
case. This should also lead to less opportunity for the remaining new ventures to ‘swap’ 
services and fewer mentorship opportunities for the new ventures in the area, depressing 
performance further. 
Owners may locate businesses in ‘hospitable’ environments unless the benefits due 
to the synergy of endowments of ‘inhospitable’ areas and owner characteristics to utilize 
those endowments outweigh the costs to locate in ‘inhospitable’ locales. Bates and Robb 
(2014b) find that small businesses (mainly services and retail) located in urban minority 
areas serving minority clientele have worse performance outcomes. Situating new ventures 
in areas which have demographics similar to the majority owners of the venture should aid 
in its performance. The venture will benefit from the social networks of the owners which 
will help in accessing resources, credit, land & infrastructure and consumers (Zaheer et al., 
2009; Zhou, 1996). In fact resources available through social ties may be difficult to imitate 
and lead to a sustainable competitive advantage (Zaheer et al., 2009). Extending the 
‘liability of foreignness’ (Hymer, 1976) to the local level, owners who set up new ventures 
in locales not familiar to them, may face challenges at cultural, political and economic 
levels. White areas are generally better than Black areas on measures such as infrastructure 
and other economic factors such as average house value or household income. The White 
business owners would thus benefit from better resources, infrastructure as well as better 
networks. However, for the Black business owners this should lead to an inherent tension, 
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they may value social ties which may be in Black neighborhoods but the economic pull 
may drive them to situate in White areas. I utilize empirics to answer whether economic 
considerations trump social tie based effects in the decision to locate a venture (for Black 
entrepreneurs) and its performance thereof. 
The demographics of an area can be used as a macro level indicator of the above 
mentioned characteristics of an area. Multiple studies have recorded the gap along above 
parameters between Blacks and Whites (Fusfeld & Bates, 1984), with Whites scoring better 
on all of the above criteria (LaVeist, 2005). Thus, ventures located in Black dominated 
areas will face a more hostile environment compared to ventures situated in White majority 
areas, which in turn should lead to worse performance by the former. 
2.2.2 Financial size of the venture 
 Strategy scholars have long posited that internal capabilities and characteristics of 
a venture are a source of competitive advantage and hence better performance (Penrose, 
1959; Wernerfelt, 1984). One important internal characteristic studied at length is firm size. 
Gibrat’s law was proposed in 1931, which stated that firm growth and size are not related. 
However, Dunne et al. (1989), Evans (1987), and other studies found that Gibrat’s law does 
not hold in many instances. These studies reported that survival increases and growth 
decreases with business age and (employment) size. Size has been operationalized using 
different variables in the literature. Some common implementations include use of net 
worth, home ownership, and inheritance levels of the entrepreneur which measure static 
levels prior to venture starting and find that incorporating these variables does lead to an 
attenuation in the coefficient of race.  Thornhill and Amit (2003) use assets of the firm as 
a proxy for size. Similar results are also obtained with decomposition analysis (Fairlie & 
Robb, 2007) – startup capital explains 30% to 40% of the explained gap in performance 
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between Black and White owned ventures. I propose to analyze the mediating role using a 
dynamic measure of financial size. This is especially pertinent in the context of a startup 
since the financial size of a venture changes over time and utilizing the initial conditions 
may not present a full picture of the impact of a time-varying variable such as financial 
size on new venture performance. I propose to explore the mediating role of financial size 
on the race ownership and performance relationship, while controlling for employee size. 
 In many prior studies, it has been shown that race of the majority of owner-
operators impacts performance. However, I theorize that the above relationship is partially 
mediated by the financial size of the firm. The assets of a firm are one dynamic indicator 
of the size of a venture (Thornhill & Amit, 2003) and they can be thought of as a proxy for 
the resources that are accessible to the venture. New ventures suffer from liability of 
newness, size provides a buffer for entrepreneurs to learn and navigate problems (Cooper 
et al., 1994). Firms with bigger size will have resources to attract experts to provide advice 
on issues (Cooper et al., 1989). The size of a new venture may also represent more options 
to the consumer leading to more revenues and profits hence better performance. For 
example a bigger retail store may carry more selection of products which will lead to 
consumers finding more choices which in turn should lead to better sales. Finally, a small 
size may inhibit product development, product launch and access to markets which will all 
hamper performance and survival of a firm. Previous studies incorporate size by either 
using a financial measure or a human resource measure, I study the impact of financial size 
while controlling for employee size. Furthermore, for external resource providers financial 
size may be a clearer signal of vitality of a new venture compared to the number of 
employees. The various assets of a venture could be used as collateral and also provide 
relatively more confidence to the suppliers, vendors and other stakeholders, that in the 
event of a venture going out of business, they could hopefully recoup their investments 
partially through the sale of the financial assets. On the other hand, given the mobility 
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potential of the employees, the human resource base of a new venture may not inspire 
similar confidence amongst the resource providers.  
 Black owned ventures usually are smaller in size compared to White owned 
ventures (Fairlie & Robb, 2007; Robb, 2002). This may be due to multiple factors as shown 
in previous literature – Blacks may not be able to get similar amounts of loans as the 
Whites, due to discrimination, thus leading to undercapitalization of businesses leading to 
smaller asset bases (Bates & Robb, 2014a, 2016). Furthermore, Blacks on average have 
lower net worth than Whites. Thus they would have fewer possessions to serve as collateral 
for loans which would again lead to a smaller asset base (Fairlie & Robb, 2007). This 
smaller size of the Black ventures compared to the White ventures should lead to bleaker 
prospects for the Black owned ventures vis a vis the White owned ventures. 
2.2.3 Credit Riskiness of a venture 
 Young and small ventures face a liability of newness (Stinchcombe & March, 
1965). New ventures usually have short track records and are fraught with risk, hence it is 
difficult for resource providers to assess their quality and provide resources to them (Stuart 
et al., 1999). Resource providers implicitly apply a ‘credit riskiness’ score (what is the 
probability of venture failure, what is the probability that the resource provided will not 
deliver the anticipated rent since the new venture may go out of business) to such new 
ventures. If certain sub populations get discriminated against on the assessment and others 
get favorable treatment in credit ratings, the net impact will be a systematic heterogeneous 
gap in the availability of financial and other resources based on the majority race ownership 
of the venture. The importance of credit scores in attaining resources is apparent, but the 
mechanism by which the scores are assessed is nebulous (Henderson et al., 2015; Spader, 
2010). Discrimination in credit scores based on race, gender and other such ‘immutable’ 
characteristics has been outlawed. The Federal Reserve Board did find that the credit scores 
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are different for different races but are not biased against any race (Braunstein, 2010). 
Blanchflower et al. (2003) show that discrimination against Black owned ventures exists 
in the small business credit market. Henderson et al. (2015) find that Black owned ventures 
receive more adverse ratings compared to what they deserve whereas White owned 
ventures receive a more favorable rating. Finally, Bates and Robb (2016) find subtle 
unfavorable ‘nudges and shoves’ for minority loan seekers.  
 Fraser (2009) finds that, even though there is no discrimination in small business 
credit markets in the UK along ethnic lines, the Black businesses have adverse credit 
outcomes compared to Whites and Indians. These adverse outcomes are a result of less 
than sterling financial practices such as missed loan repayments and overdraft excesses 
associated with Black owned businesses. Bates (1973) also found erratic repayments and 
higher delinquency rates amongst Black business owners in the New York, Boston and 
Chicago areas.  
 Accumulation of resources is a pivotal activity for a new venture. Resources play 
an important role in enabling the entire value chain of the product in a firm. This point 
becomes especially salient in the context of new ventures which are generally ‘resource 
sparse’. Resources can be of multiple kinds – for example credit lines, supplier credit, 
provision of service by employees, credit by consumers, provision of valued or critical 
equipment etc. The provision of these resources to a new venture by the resource providers 
is a business decision. Resource providers need to evaluate the ‘riskiness’ and opportunity 
costs before deciding which ventures will receive the use of their assets. It is logical to infer 
that ceteris paribus resource providers will invest time, resources and effort in new ventures 
from which they expect to recoup their investment and a profit. Thus, they will invest in 
less risky ventures all else being equal.  
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 Barter or ‘quid pro quo‘ type arrangements are also common in general business 
situations (Winborg & Landström, 2001) and more so in new ventures. I argue, that even 
in such arrangements, amongst other aspects a key analysis partners are conducting is 
whether a particular counterparty will be a ‘going concern’ and possess the finances to pay 
the ‘dues’, when the time comes to collect on the favors it is owed.  
 Thus, I study the mediating role of credit riskiness of a venture on the majority race 
ownership and venture performance relationship. I predict that credit riskiness, which is a 
proxy for the ability of a venture to access resources in future, is most likely mediating the 
relationship between majority race ownership of the venture and performance. 
 Data, Measures and Methods 
2.3.1 Data Source and Sample 
The Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS) is a confidential dataset that has been used in 
prior studies such as Robb and Robinson (2012). It is a longitudinal dataset of 
approximately 5,000 new ventures started in 2004. The KFS started with an initial sample 
of 250,000 firms, provided by D&B. A business was defined as started in 2004 if it was a 
new independent business created by an individual or team, or purchase of an existing 
business or the purchase of a franchise. Businesses that paid state unemployment insurance, 
or Federal Social Security tax or had an EIN or had schedule C income prior to or after 
2004 were excluded. Out of this sample, 4,928 firms were admitted with an oversampling 
of high-tech firms; weights have been provided by KFS in order to make the sample 
representative of all new ventures in the economy. These firms were surveyed annually in 
detail from 2004 to 2011, creating an eight-year panel. The KFS has a balanced panel of 
3,140 firms, but since the focus of the current study was on majority ownership, hence I 
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restricted the study to ventures which had 50% or more of the owner team belonging to 
one race. I focused on ventures owned by Whites, Blacks and Asians since venture 
ownership by other races represented no more than 1% of ventures. This led to a sample 
size of 2,918 ventures. Furthermore, various variables such as profits or credit classification 
scores were not available for some ventures in some years. Hence, the number of 
observations in regressions may vary across models of survival, revenues and profits. The 
sample has information on up to 10 owners, initially and later 15 owners, including age, 
gender, race, ethnicity, education, and previous work experience. Detailed financial 
information about the ventures, location, revenues, expenses, number of employees, and 
profit/loss, among many other firm-level variables are also available in the dataset. The 
KFS dataset was merged with data at the zip code level from the Census, to develop 
measures of demographics. 
2.3.2 Measures 
2.3.2.1 Dependent Variables 
Survival – a venture was recorded as surviving each year it was in business as an 
independent entity. If the venture survived till the end of the survey period (year 2011) it 
was censored. In the data, failure is coded as 1 (to signify an event) and survival (status 
quo as 0). 
Log Total Revenues – are the logarithm of leading total revenues of a venture. For 
computational purposes $1 was added to the raw revenue numbers and then a log taken. 
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Log Net Profits – are the logarithm of leading net profits of a venture. $1 is added to the 
absolute value of Net profits (as Net Profits can be zero), and then logarithms were taken. 
Finally, if the profits were negative, the log values were multiplied by -1. 
2.3.2.2 Independent Variables  
Majority race owners of firm – Similar to Bitler et al. (2001), a venture was deemed as 
belonging to a particular race if the number of active owner operators of a particular race 
in the venture were greater than or equal to 50% and all other races individually had 
representation that was less than 50%. Ventures which were owned equally by two or more 
races were dropped from analyses.  
Demographics of a location – in order to capture the characteristics of a zip code, I use 
dummy variables indicating whether a zip code is White, Black or other race majority. A 
location is deemed as White majority if the population of Whites in the zip code is greater 
than 50%, similarly for Black and other races. 
Assets of the firm – I operationalize size as the log of assets of a venture. This is a time 
varying measure as KFS collected various components of the assets of a venture annually. 
These mainly comprised - cash, accounts receivables, equipment, inventory, land and 
buildings, vehicles etc., which were added up to arrive at the total tangible assets of a 
venture. Logs of assets were used to control for skewness and high standard deviation.  
Credit Risk Classification Score of a venture – The credit riskiness of a venture is captured 
by the Credit Score Classification of the venture. This is a categorical variable with a score 
of 1 indicating minimal risk and 5 representing high risk. Data were imputed for some 
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missing values for which logical imputation was possible3. Similar scores have been used 
by the Federal Reserve and in past studies (Henderson et al., 2015). 
2.3.2.3 Control Variables 
I controlled for a number of factors that might impact survival and performance.  
Education - Previous research shows education impacts survival (Cooper et al., 1994) and 
performance thus variables indicating the proportions of various levels of education were 
introduced. However, education had minimal explanatory power in explaining the gap in 
performance between Black and White ventures (Fairlie & Robb, 2007). 
Work experience in the same industry – Prior work experience in an industry provides 
networks and knowledge about customers and suppliers (Cooper et al., 1994; Delmar & 
Shane, 2004). I measure work experience in the same industry as the average number of 
years of such experience of the venture founding team. Similar to education, this variable 
too has been found to have minimal explanatory power for the gap in performance (Fairlie 
& Robb, 2007). 
Age – the average age of owner operators was used in models since it will be correlated 
with higher levels of industry experience. 
Number of active owner operators – The active owner operators of a new venture are 
human capital that could be crucial for the survival and performance of the venture. More 
owner operators will bring in more resources, human, social and financial capital and 
improve performance. Thus, I controlled for number of active owner operators. 
                                                 
3 Credit Risk Classification Scores were back or forward filled using the scores available for the nearest year. 
For example if credit classification score data was not available for a new venture for the year 2004, but was 
available for 2005, then the 2005 score was back filled for 2004. 
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Number of employees – I use a time varying measure to account for the employee based 
size of a venture. Previous research has shown that survival increases with number of 
employees since more employees implies more resources and scale (Bruderl & Schussler, 
1990; Carroll & Hannan, 2000). I corrected for skewness by taking the log transformation. 
Legal Form – Bruderl and Schussler (1990) show that hazard of failure of German new 
ventures when the ventures were incorporated is lower. Thus, I control for the legal form 
of a venture with a dummy variable equal to 1 if the venture is a sole proprietorship rather 
than a limited liability company. 
Other controls - the ‘average’ gender of the venture since female led ventures have higher 
survival rates was controlled. The technology type of a venture – whether it was high, 
medium or low - may lead to different rates of survival and performance, and hence was 
controlled for. Controls for provision of service and product by the venture were also 
included. Average hours worked by the owner operators were also controlled for since this 
represents the effort put in by the founders in making the venture a viable enterprise. 
Proportion of US citizens – Oyelere and Belton (2013) found that intragroup heterogeneity 
based on country of citizenship of the entrepreneur or of her parents could impact survival 
of the venture. Hence, I control for citizenship by including a variable of the proportion of 
US citizens amongst the owner operators.  
2.3.3 Model Choice 
 The three key indicators of performance I study are survival, total revenues and net 
profits. Pooled models with clustered standard errors and time dummies, and accounting 
for the survey nature of the data were used in most of the specifications. Survival models 
were assessed using pooled Logit models (with time dummies). Alternatively, Cox 
Proportional Hazard models could also have been used but Logit was preferred since most 
of the mediation analyses such as Fairlie, and Marginal Structural Models use pooled Logit 
 21 
in the analyses. Hence, a comparison of coefficients across models is feasible with Logit 
models for survival. However, Survival and Probit models were utilized for the base 
regression for robustness checks (with broadly similar results). The pooled OLS model was 
employed for Total Revenues and Net Profits since panel data models with fixed effects 
would drop out the time invariant variable coefficients such as majority race ownership, 
which is of primary interest in the current study.  
 Mediation effects were tested with three broad class of models – the decomposition 
approach (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973) and its nonlinear extension (Fairlie, 1999, 2005b), 
the Baron and Kenny (1986) approach and finally the Marginal Structural Model (Lange 
et al., 2012).  
 The Oaxaca decomposition with time dummies was utilized for decomposition 
analyses of total revenues and net profits, in addition to the Baron & Kenny approach. I 
applied the Fairlie approach for survival decomposition. However, the Fairlie 
decomposition utilizes separate Logit regressions for Black and White groups, and the 
number of Black businesses are relatively small in the sample, which may lead to biased 
coefficient estimates (Nemes et al., 2009)4. As an alternative, I also employed, a Linear 
Probability Model (LPM) with Oaxaca decomposition. A couple of limitations of the LPM 
are that it does not constrain predicted values of probabilities between 0 and 1 and it 
introduces heteroskedasticity in error terms. The former is not a major concern since I am 
not predicting outcomes, but the latter could be a cause of concern in interpreting results. 
 In order to test for mediation effects using the Baron and Kenny (1986) approach, 
I followed the standard four step process. Although widely used, a few limitations have 
                                                 
4 This could be a possible reason why the Fairlie estimates over explain the difference (refer results section), 
even though they are directionally congruent with Baron & Kenny or Marginal Structural Models. However, 
another explanation could be that Black owned ventures would outperform White owned ventures if the 
Black ventures had endowments of the White ventures. 
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been highlighted with the use of Baron and Kenny (1986) approach to non-linear mediation 
such as it may give varying results as the sample size changes (Tein & MacKinnon, 2003) 
and may be unsuitable in the presence of interaction effects between the mediator and the 
treatment (VanderWeele & Vansteelandt, 2009). Thus, I use the Marginal Structural 
Modeling (MSM) approach as proposed by Lange et al. (2012) as a robustness check. This 
approach is based on counterfactual analysis with the use of Inverse Probability of 
Treatment Weighting technique. A limitation of the approach is that it uses only ‘base’ 
variables (variables from 2004). I include time dummies to the regressions to address this 
issue. MSM based mediation analysis is a topic of ongoing research and to the author’s 
best knowledge techniques that can handle time varying variables in unbalanced panels 
and non-linear dependent variables are yet to be developed. 
 Results 
 I begin the analyses with simple cross tabulations and t-tests, which are aimed at an 
intuitive understanding of the differences in performance between White and Black owned 
ventures.  
 Table 2-1 shows endowment and other differences between White owned and Black 
owned new ventures for the year 2004 (note revenues and profits are leading hence are 
from 2005). I observe significant differences between the two groups, with Whites 
performing better on all measures and possessing more endowments. White owned 
businesses have average revenues of $5,200 whereas Black owned ventures $100. 
Furthermore, variables such as Assets, Credit Risk Classification Score, age and work 
experience show differences between the two groups and hence as discussed earlier are 
worth investigating. Table 2-2 explains that businesses have a higher proclivity of situating 
in White majority zip codes (97.5% of White owned and 61.3% of the Black owned 
ventures are situated in White majority zip codes). Table 2-3 confirms my assertion that 
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ventures in White majority zip code areas perform better than ventures in Black majority 
zip codes (the significance in t-tests for Net Profits and Survival is at 10.7% and 10.8%, 
respectively). Finally, Table 2-3 illustrates that for the areas in which KFS ventures are 
located, there are significant differences in the average household income and average 
house values in the White vs Black majority zip codes, with Black majority zip codes being 
less affluent. 
 









Revenues (USD) 5,271.13 102.51 5,168.62 0.471 8.35 
Net Profits (USD) 6.42 -2.54 8.96 0.799 3.50 
Life 5.596 5.126 0.471 0.292 1.61 
Log Firm Assets 9.093 7.007 2.086 0.345 6.05 
Credit Risk 3.372 3.513 -0.141 0.062 -2.29 
Average Age Owners 45.272 43.360 1.912 0.797 2.40 
Avg. Same Ind Work Ex 11.661 10.014 1.646 0.714 2.30 
Avg Education 6.050 5.920 0.130 0.158 0.82 
Provides Product 0.527 0.406 0.121 0.041 2.95 
Provides Service 0.851 0.903 -0.052 0.024 -2.13 
Sole Proprietor 0.350 0.447 -0.097 0.041 -2.36 
Avg Hrs worked 40.301 41.616 -1.315 2.005 -0.66 
Total Active Founders 1.383 1.224 0.160 0.045 3.57 
Log Total Employees 0.711 0.562 0.150 0.053 2.82 























zip code 2435 125 2560 
Black majority 
zip code 61 82 143 
TOTAL 2496 207 2702 









zip code Difference 
Standard 
Error T-stat 
Revenues (USD) 4,129.87 266.94 3,862.93 0.651 4.21 
Net Profits (USD) 5.38 -1.06 6.44 1.081 1.61 
Life 5.596 5.126 0.471 0.292 1.61 
Avg Household Income 
(USD) 49,551 36,470 13,081 1,751 7.06 
Avg House Value (USD) 155,873 92,619 63,254 5,126 11.83 
 
 Summary statistics of the variables are provided in Table 2-4 (due to disclosure 
constraints maxima, minima and correlation values have been omitted). Ventures were 
started by an individual or a team with average work experience in the same industry of 
11.5 years and 45 years of age. This points to the fact that businesses are usually started by 
mature and experienced individuals. Only 2% of the ventures are categorized as high 
technology, whereas 85% are low technology, that is, most of the business ventures are 
non-innovative businesses. 86% of the ventures provide services, which seems reasonable 
given that US is a service economy. A super majority (89%) of the new ventures were 
started by Whites, followed by Blacks (9%), which approximately reflects the demography 
of US. Finally, the new ventures are small with 1.4 active owner operators. 
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Table 2-4: Descriptive statistics of variables in econometric models (2004 values 
used) 
 Mean S.D. N 
Log Revenues 8.24 5.16 2548 
Log Net Profits 1.64 9.10 2411 
White Owned 0.89 0.32 2918 
Black Owned 0.09 0.28 2918 
Asian Owned 0.03 0.16 2918 
Log Firm Assets 8.94 3.68 2911 
Credit Risk 3.38 0.73 2898 
White Majority zipcode 0.90 0.31 2918 
Black Majority zipcode 0.05 0.22 2918 
Other Race Majority zipcode 0.06 0.23 2918 
Avg. Same Ind Work Ex 11.45 9.99 2916 
Av. Ed. (yrs) 14.84 2.55 2883 
Edu., HS or less 0.15 0.34 2917 
Edu., Technical 0.07 0.24 2917 
Edu., Some Clg 0.22 0.38 2917 
Edu., Associate 0.09 0.27 2917 
Edu., Bachelors 0.26 0.41 2917 
Edu., Some Grad 0.05 0.21 2917 
Edu., Masters 0.12 0.31 2917 
Edu., PhDs/Prof. 0.04 0.19 2917 
Avg. Age 44.98 10.31 2915 
Hi Tech 0.02 0.13 2918 
Med. Tech 0.13 0.34 2918 
Low tech 0.85 0.36 2918 
Sole Proprietor 0.36 0.48 2918 
Provides Product 0.51 0.50 2918 
Provides Service 0.86 0.35 2918 
Prop. US Cit. 0.97 0.15 2917 
Prop. Male 0.68 0.42 2918 
Tot. Active Fndrs 1.37 0.71 2918 
Log Total Employees 0.70 0.79 2854 
*Figures may not add up due to rounding 
 
 Table 2-5 tabulates the differences in some key variables between White and Black 
owned ventures in White and Black majority zip codes. In most cases the White owned 
ventures in White areas possess the most favorable attributes, and Black ventures in Black 
majority zip codes are the worst off. A similar pattern is observed in the outcome variables 
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such as Revenues and Profits. However, survival seems to be comparable across race and 
location, except for Black owned businesses in Black majority zipcodes. 
 Table 2-6, shows the results of decomposition analyses. Assets and Credit 
Riskiness are consistently significant and their coefficients indicate that these variables are 
sizeable contributors to the gap, across all three models – Survival, Revenues and Net 
Profits. Contributions of the Location variable are ambivalent, either coefficients are small 
or not statistically significant. Finally, individual level characteristics such as industry work 
experience, education and age are relatively small contributors or insignificant, echoing 
results similar to Fairlie and Robb (2007). Hence, the individual level variables are moved 
to controls and only the assets, credit riskiness and location are investigated further using 
other mediation techniques. It is worth noting that the Fairlie decomposition over explains 
the gap between Black and White owned ventures, which may indicate that if the 
endowments of White ventures were to be allocated to the Black owned ventures they 









Table 2-5: White owned vs Black owned ventures by location 
 














Log Total Revenues 8.58 6.48 5.05 4.66 
Log Net Profits 1.86 1.72 -0.85 -1.25 
Survival 5.61 5.68 5.68 4.80 
Log Total Assets 9.10 7.68 6.99 6.89 
Credit Risk 
Classification Score 3.38 3.39 3.46 3.50 
Avg Age Owners 45.22 44.50 43.73 42.10 
Avg Same Ind Work 
Ex 11.69 11.40 9.53 10.45 
Avg Education 6.04 5.94 6.21 5.69 
Provides Product 0.53 0.47 0.43 0.37 
Provides Service 0.85 0.88 0.88 0.91 
Sole Proprietorship 0.35 0.36 0.43 0.41 
Avg Hrs worked - 
owners 40.38 40.67 39.66 44.06 
Log Total Size - 
Employees 0.71 0.78 0.57 0.57 
Number of Owner 
Operators 1.39 1.31 1.25 1.24 









Table 2-6: Decomposition Analyses for Survival, Revenues and Net Profits 
  





Oaxaca - Net 
Profits 
Black owned 0.0822  6.2076 -0.6676 
White owned 0.0655  9.4535 2.7621 
Difference 0.0167  -3.2459 -3.4297 
Explained    -1.3868 -1.0065 
Unexplained    -1.8591 -2.4232 
         
  Coeff T-stat  Coeff T-stat   Coeff T-stat 
Log Firm Assets 0.0135 5.61  -0.7295 -6.75   -0.6597 -5.34 
Credit Risk 0.0088 4.81  -0.1306 -3.84   -0.3466 -4.22 
Race Location 0.0037 0.84  -0.1914 -1.52   -0.3796 -1.42 
Avg. Same Ind Work Ex 0.0016 3.31  -0.0263 -1.46   -0.0942 -1.80 
Education 0.0000 -0.04  -0.0513 -1.29   -0.1300 -1.82 
Average Age Owners -0.0010 -1.59  0.0340 1.52   0.1079 1.61 
Provides Product 0.0001 0.12  -0.0321 -1.67   0.1626 2.16 
Provides Service -0.0005 -1.09  0.0075 0.86   0.0282 1.09 
Sole Proprietor -0.0021 -2.51  -0.1057 -2.38   0.1944 2.30 
Avg Hrs worked 0.0001 0.10  -0.0020 -0.04   -0.0029 -0.07 
Technology 0.0000 -0.28  0.0098 0.63   0.0403 1.21 
Prop. US Cit. 0.0001 0.77  0.0000 0.01   -0.0003 -0.11 
Prop. Male 0.0000 -0.08  0.0001 0.02   -0.0032 -0.16 
Total Active Founders 0.0009 1.43  -0.0044 -0.24   0.0341 0.77 
Log Total Employees -0.0003 -0.38  -0.1349 -2.66   0.0403 0.99 
Time -0.0007 -1.15  -0.0301 -1.35   0.0023 0.21 
TOTAL 0.0242    -1.3868     -1.0065   
  
 Tables 2-7 and 2-8 analyze the crucial steps for supporting Baron and Kenny’s, 
(1986) mediation approach by showing that majority race ownership is correlated with 
assets or credit riskiness and that when assets or credit riskiness are included in the same 
model as majority race ownership, the coefficient of the majority race ownership for all 
three regressions – survival, total revenues and net profits decrease5. A negative coefficient 
                                                 
5 Table 2-9 of the Appendix presents the regression model with controls only and controls and the categorical 
race variable, thus establishing the base relationship as echoed in many past studies that majority race 
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in survival regressions implies a reduction in the hazard of death (since failure is coded as 
1 and survival as 0 in the data). The interpretation for revenue and net profit regressions 
are obvious. These tables support the mediation role of assets and credit riskiness. The 
other steps of the Baron, Kenny mediation analysis are covered in the Appendix Tables 2-
11, 2-12 and 2-13. As an extra check, to ensure that assets and credit riskiness are acting 
as independent mediators, I incorporate them in the same model in Table 2-14 and find that 
the coefficients are independently significant. I also note that in some of the above models, 
the credit riskiness coefficients are marginally significant, but it can be observed that the 
sign of coefficients is broadly supporting the story.  
 
Table 2-7: Assets Mediation Pooled Regressions 
























White Owned -0.333* -0.131 2.728*** 2.143*** 3.527*** 2.987*** 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.30) (0.28) (0.52) (0.52) 
Asian Owned -1.049** -0.825* 2.993*** 2.351*** 4.248*** 3.653*** 
 (0.34) (0.35) (0.49) (0.44) (1.05) (1.03) 
Log Firm Assets  -0.086***  0.357***  0.336*** 
  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.04) 
Controls included? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
observations 
16284 16284 13117 13117 12799 12799 
R-sq   0.2118 0.2566 0.0530 0.0641 






                                                 
ownership does indeed impact performance. Table 2-10 presents evidence which supports the view that 
location may not be having an independent effect on new venture performance. 
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Table 2-8: Credit Risk Mediation Pooled Regressions 
























White Owned -0.333* -0.167 2.728*** 2.588*** 3.527*** 3.215*** 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.30) (0.30) (0.52) (0.52) 
Asian Owned -1.049** -0.859* 2.993*** 2.922*** 4.248*** 4.052*** 
 (0.34) (0.35) (0.49) (0.48) (1.05) (1.04) 
Credit Risk = 1  -1.579***  1.460***  3.454*** 
  (0.36)  (0.34)  (0.87) 
Credit Risk = 2  -1.023***  0.766**  2.430*** 
  (0.16)  (0.26)  (0.60) 
Credit Risk = 3  -0.697***  0.220  1.314* 
  (0.13)  (0.25)  (0.55) 
Credit Risk = 4  -0.514***  -0.319  0.774 
  (0.14)  (0.29)  (0.59) 
Controls 
included? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
observations 
16284 16284 13117 13117 12799 12799 
R-sq   0.2118 0.2180 0.0530 0.0593 




 Robustness and Endogeneity 
 I conducted different robustness checks and found broad support for the results. I 
employ the Linear Probability Model with Oaxaca decomposition (Table 2-15) which over 
explains the gap if we focus on the coefficients of the three above mentioned variables 
(again Race of Location is insignificant). I thus employ the Marginal Structural Model, the 
results of which are reported in Tables 2-16 and 2-17 of the Appendix. For the survival 
regressions, Model 1 in both tables, I observe that the coefficients for direct and indirect 
effects are indicative of a mediation effect, however the significance levels are slightly 
lower.  
 I evaluated Cox and pooled Probit models for survival (Table 2-18 of the Appendix) 
and also conducted mediation analysis for demography of the location using the proportion 
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of populations of various races in the zip code and results were similar. Tein and 
MacKinnon (2003) observed that the results of mediation analyses using the product and 
difference approaches matched for Accelerated Failure Time models of survival but were 
divergent for Cox Proportional Hazard models. I compared the coefficients of AFT and 
Cox models and found them to be very similar, thus further bolstering confidence in the 
results. 
 There are multiple types of potential endogeneity possible in the current study and 
I do not claim to have addressed all of them. Survival bias may be a concern given that 
total revenues and net profits are not observed for ventures that went out of business. Thus, 
the above estimates condition on survival up to the point in time that the venture exists as 
an independent entity. An ideal solution to the issue would be the use of Heckman selection 
models, however I was unable to find a variable in the dataset which affects survival but 
not performance. I however, test the results using another alternative approach. I assess 
regression models on firms that survived till the end of the survey and find similar results. 
Secondly, the direction of the survival bias can be inferred with the available data. I find 
that the differences between Black and White owned ventures persist over long periods of 
time conditional on survival, thus if all the ventures were to survive, we should still observe 
similar directional results in the performance gaps and the mechanisms. 
 Another endogeneity concern could be regarding the quality of the idea of the 
venture. Higher quality ideas should on average lead to better performance. An ideal 
solution would be to develop a measure of quality of ideas (ensuring that it is highly 
correlated with performance), however the author is not aware of such a measure in the 
KFS data. I use level of education of the owners as a proxy for the quality of the idea and 
control for it in regressions, the implicit assumption being that highly educated teams will 
have better and more sophisticated ideas. It is a crude proxy but nonetheless captures the 
essence of this endogeneity concern. 
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 Discussion 
 Past research suggests that performance of new ventures is related to the race of the 
primary owner(s). It is important to understand, how these differences in performance 
occur above and beyond the characteristics of a primary owner and at the level of a venture, 
so that policy intervention can be addressed correctly. Given that the Black community 
faces numerous obstacles to social and economic mobility, starting and successfully 
running one’s own venture could be a ticket out of low socio-economic status for many a 
Black household. White owned ventures have been shown to possess better performance 
prospects than Black owned ventures (Robb, 2002). Decomposition analyses uses 
individual characteristic endowments of primary owners to explain the performance gap 
between the White and Black ventures. However, more venture level studies are required 
which focus on the mechanisms of how the survival gap between Black and White ventures 
is induced due to the external environment and internal venture level characteristics. In this 
research, I investigated mediators at multiple levels to understand their role on majority 
race ownership and performance relationship. I assessed how the demographics of the area 
where a venture is located, how the financial size of a new venture, the credit riskiness of 
a new venture and owner team characteristics mediate the above relationship. 
 I did not find support for the mediation by demography of the location of a venture. 
It seems entrepreneurs are savvy enough to understand and either tailor or open ventures 
which are demanded by an area. This points to the fact that policy should be focused on 
the internal characteristics of the venture which is a more micro level approach rather than 
following a more macro approach of ameliorating an area. The aforementioned implication 
is in the context of reducing the performance gap between White and Black owned 
ventures. There could be many others policy reasons for which underdeveloped areas need 
to be developed, which the author does not preclude. Black owned ventures are financially 
smaller than the White owned ventures, and this difference is path dependent, it does not 
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decrease over time. The difference in financial size has a profound impact on the outcomes 
of White vs Black ventures, thus developing innovative and subsidized approaches so that 
Black ventures get access to a similar level of asset base as the White owned ventures 
should be helpful in reducing the performance gap. Future studies could also explore what 
types of assets for example tangible vs intangible, are more relevant to reducing the 
performance gap. Studies and analyses on whether financial size could lead to the 
acquisition of human resource size in a short span of time and how that impacts 
performance could further our knowledge on “time compression diseconomies” (Dierickx 
& Cool, 1989) as well. 
 Finally, I found that credit riskiness of a new venture is an important mechanism in 
determining the difference between performances of Black and White ventures. Black 
owned ventures will have a lower probability of obtaining resources at a level similar to 
White owned ventures, due to the difference in credit ratings. I also find that these lower 
credit ratings in turn negatively impact the performance of Black owned ventures compared 
to White owned ventures. Thus, policies which bolster the credit scores of Black ventures 
either through provision of training to better manage their business or temporary boost to 
their credit scores to make them equivalent to White ventures’ scores should alleviate some 
of the performance differences.  
 With the study, I draw attention to the need of understanding the mechanisms 
involved in the differential performance of Black vs White owned ventures. More studies 
are required to understand what other social or economic constructs may be at play. 
Another fruitful avenue of research could be related to exploring under what conditions the 
performance differences exacerbate or reduce for example in high technology ventures or 
ventures in certain industries. I also contribute to the age old debate about resource 
acquisition and size and their relationship to performance. 
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 Appendix A 
 
Table 2-9: Pooled Regressions for New Ventures 












 coef/std err coef/std err coef/std err coef/std err coef/std err coef/std err 
White Owned    -0.333* 2.728*** 3.527*** 
    (0.14) (0.30) (0.52) 
Asian Owned    -1.049** 2.993*** 4.248*** 
    (0.34) (0.49) (1.05) 
Avg. Same Ind Work Ex -0.014** 0.017* 0.063*** -0.015** 0.015 0.060*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) 
Edu., Technical -0.304 -0.690 -1.746* -0.298 -0.529 -1.507* 
 (0.20) (0.41) (0.73) (0.20) (0.38) (0.70) 
Edu., Some Clg -0.368** -0.263 -0.927 -0.338* -0.182 -0.811 
 (0.14) (0.31) (0.61) (0.14) (0.31) (0.60) 
Edu., Associate -0.383* -0.528 -2.147** -0.367* -0.339 -1.892** 
 (0.18) (0.37) (0.74) (0.18) (0.36) (0.73) 
Edu., Bachelors -0.506*** 0.581* 0.182 -0.436** 0.565* 0.162 
 (0.13) (0.29) (0.57) (0.14) (0.28) (0.56) 
Edu., Some Grad -0.800*** 0.040 -1.818* -0.775*** 0.219 -1.601* 
 (0.22) (0.38) (0.80) (0.22) (0.37) (0.79) 
Edu., Masters -0.656*** 0.428 -0.099 -0.604*** 0.516 0.018 
 (0.16) (0.31) (0.65) (0.16) (0.31) (0.65) 
Edu., PhDs/Prof. -1.032*** 0.063 0.827 -0.926*** 0.015 0.738 
 (0.24) (0.45) (0.87) (0.24) (0.45) (0.86) 
Avg. Age -0.005 -0.010 -0.058*** -0.003 -0.012 -0.060*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) 
Provides Product -0.116 0.580*** -1.331*** -0.082 0.510*** -1.415*** 
 (0.09) (0.15) (0.31) (0.09) (0.14) (0.30) 
Provides Service -0.281* 0.240 0.916 -0.231* 0.252 0.928* 
 (0.11) (0.23) (0.47) (0.12) (0.21) (0.47) 
Sole Proprietor -0.288** -1.187*** 1.138** -0.269** -1.103*** 1.246*** 
 (0.09) (0.19) (0.35) (0.09) (0.18) (0.34) 
Avg. Hours worked by 
owner/s 
-0.009*** 0.044*** 0.035*** -0.009*** 0.044*** 0.035*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Hi Tech -0.231 0.712*** 0.104 -0.239* 0.669*** 0.056 
 (0.12) (0.20) (0.50) (0.12) (0.20) (0.50) 
Med. Tech -0.240** 0.282 0.862* -0.231* 0.328* 0.927** 
 (0.09) (0.16) (0.35) (0.09) (0.16) (0.35) 
Prop. US Cit. -0.700*** 0.876 0.562 -0.701*** 1.003 0.830 
 (0.18) (0.65) (1.22) (0.20) (0.65) (1.23) 
Prop. Male -0.134 0.125 0.503 -0.105 0.138 0.528 
 (0.10) (0.21) (0.39) (0.10) (0.20) (0.39) 
Tot. Active Fndrs -0.182* 0.141 -0.032 -0.147 0.103 -0.082 
 (0.08) (0.11) (0.23) (0.08) (0.11) (0.23) 
Log Total Employees -0.073 1.078*** 0.111 -0.068 1.069*** 0.104 
 (0.06) (0.09) (0.23) (0.06) (0.09) (0.23) 
Time dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept  4.598*** 1.106  2.062* -2.340 
  (0.84) (1.57)  (0.88) (1.65) 
Number of observations 16284 13117 12799 16284 13117 12799 
R-sq  0.1903 0.0426  0.2118 0.0530 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 2-10: Assets, Credit Risk and Race Location based Pooled Regressions 












 coef/std err coef/std err coef/std err coef/std err coef/std err coef/std err 
White Owned    0.059 1.966*** 2.543*** 
    (0.17) (0.29) (0.57) 
Asian Owned    -0.545 2.152*** 3.268** 
    (0.36) (0.44) (1.04) 
Log Firm Assets -0.077*** 0.364*** 0.339*** -0.078*** 0.345*** 0.312*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) 
Credit Risk = 1 -1.425*** 1.169*** 3.242*** -1.436*** 0.991** 3.024*** 
 (0.36) (0.33) (0.86) (0.36) (0.32) (0.86) 
Credit Risk = 2 -0.930*** 0.639** 2.356*** -0.931*** 0.471 2.152*** 
 (0.16) (0.24) (0.59) (0.17) (0.24) (0.59) 
Credit Risk = 3 -0.650*** 0.165 1.287* -0.642*** 0.059 1.150* 
 (0.13) (0.24) (0.54) (0.13) (0.24) (0.54) 
Credit Risk = 4 -0.485*** -0.271 0.826 -0.478** -0.346 0.731 
 (0.15) (0.27) (0.58) (0.15) (0.26) (0.58) 
White maj. zip code -0.237 1.415*** 1.975* -0.234 0.561 0.887 
 (0.17) (0.41) (0.80) (0.19) (0.42) (0.85) 
Othr Race maj. zip 
code 
-0.500 1.475** 1.777 -0.445 0.949* 1.078 
 (0.26) (0.48) (1.02) (0.27) (0.47) (1.03) 
Controls included? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
observations 
16284 13117 12799 16284 13117 12799 
R-sq  0.2515 0.0646  0.2609 0.0693 




Table 2-11: Race Location based Pooled Regressions 
 Model 1:  
Survival 
Model 2:  
Revenues 
Model 3:  
Profits 
 coef/std err coef/std err coef/std err 
White majority zip code -0.540*** 1.935*** 2.573** 
 (0.16) (0.47) (0.83) 
Other Race majority zip code -0.811** 2.066*** 2.425* 
 (0.26) (0.55) (1.08) 
Controls included? Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies? Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 16284 13117 12799 
R-sq  0.1969 0.0459 







Table 2-12: Assets and Credit Risk based Pooled Regressions 


























-0.089*** 0.385*** 0.376***    
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.04)    
Credit Risk = 1    -1.607*** 1.814*** 3.878*** 
    (0.36) (0.35) (0.87) 
Credit Risk = 2    -1.064*** 1.089*** 2.813*** 
    (0.16) (0.27) (0.60) 
Credit Risk = 3    -0.740*** 0.441 1.585** 
    (0.12) (0.26) (0.56) 
Credit Risk = 4    -0.552*** -0.160 0.967 
    (0.14) (0.30) (0.60) 
Controls 
included? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
observations 
16284 13117 12799 16284 13117 12799 
R-sq  0.2436 0.0567  0.1988 0.0506 




Table 2-13: Assets and Credit Risk Mediation Pooled Regressions 










 coef/std err coef/std err coef/std err coef/std err 
White Owned 2.098*** 1.678*** -0.463*** -0.405*** 
 (0.26) (0.21) (0.06) (0.06) 
Asian Owned 2.609*** 1.731*** -0.475*** -0.357*** 
 (0.43) (0.38) (0.10) (0.10) 
Controls 
included? 
No Yes No Yes 
Time dummies? No Yes No Yes 
Number of 
observations 
16581 16284 16581 16284 
R-sq 0.0273 0.2351 0.0180 0.0798 











Table 2-14: Race Firm, Assets and Credit Risk Pooled Regressions 
























White Owned -0.333* 0.004 2.728*** 2.060*** 3.527*** 2.746*** 
 (0.14) (0.15) (0.30) (0.28) (0.52) (0.52) 
Asian Owned -1.049** -0.663 2.993*** 2.324*** 4.248*** 3.519*** 
 (0.34) (0.35) (0.49) (0.44) (1.05) (1.02) 
Log Firm 
Assets 
 -0.079***  0.347***  0.315*** 
  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.04) 
Credit Risk = 1  -1.452***  1.028**  3.067*** 
  (0.36)  (0.33)  (0.86) 
Credit Risk = 2  -0.945***  0.487*  2.177*** 
  (0.16)  (0.24)  (0.59) 
Credit Risk = 3  -0.657***  0.076  1.177* 
  (0.13)  (0.24)  (0.54) 
Credit Risk = 4  -0.498***  -0.325  0.760 
  (0.14)  (0.26)  (0.59) 
Controls 
included? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time 
dummies? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
observations 
16284 16284 13117 13117 12799 12799 
R-sq   0.2118 0.2600 0.0530 0.0690 










Table 2-15: LPM Survival Decomposition 
  LPM with Oaxaca - Survival 
Black owned 0.0822 
  




   
  Coeff T-stat 
Log Firm Assets 0.0123 4.87 
Credit Risk 0.0081 4.20 
Race Location 0.0032 0.72 
Avg. Same Ind Work Ex 0.0013 1.78 
Education -0.0009 -0.80 
Average Age Owners -0.0007 -1.17 
Provides Product -0.0002 -0.26 
Provides Service -0.0002 -0.69 
Sole Proprietor -0.0020 -1.95 
Avg Hrs worked 0.0000 0.02 
Technology -0.0003 -0.70 
Prop. US Cit. 0.0000 0.26 
Prop. Male 0.0000 0.09 
Total Active Founders 0.0004 0.79 
Log Total Employees -0.0003 -0.49 
Time 0.0001 0.16 







Table 2-16: Marginal Structural Model Assets 






 coef/z score coef/z score coef/z score 
White Owned - Direct Effect -0.241 2.245** 3.307** 
 (-1.58) (6.57) (6.14) 
White Owned - Indirect Effect -0.066+ 0.576** 0.542** 
 (-1.68) (5.84) (3.47) 
Controls included? Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies? Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 31376 25270 24634 





Table 2-17: Marginal Structural Model Credit Risk 




Model 3:  
Profits 
 coef/z score coef/z score coef/z score 
White Owned - Direct Effect -0.276+ 2.708** 3.521** 
 (-1.85) (8.27) (6.72) 
White Owned - Indirect Effect -0.026** 0.034** 0.015 
 (-4.23) (2.81) (0.64) 
Controls included? Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies? Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 31398 25288 24650 





Table 2-18: Pooled Regressions for New Ventures 









 coef/std err coef/std err coef/std err 
White Owned -0.333* -0.187** -0.220+ 
 (0.14) (0.07) (0.13) 
Asian Owned -1.049** -0.554** -0.715* 
 (0.34) (0.16) (0.32) 
Controls included? Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies? Yes Yes No 
Number of 
observations 
16284 16284 16390 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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CHAPTER 3. IMPACT OF DIVERSE OWNER TEAM 
CHARACTERISTICS ON NEW VENTURE SURVIVAL6 
 Introduction 
Ventures are increasingly being founded and run by teams (Watson, Stewart, & 
BarNir, 2003). Every year 400,000 – 500,000 startups are founded in the US and 50% of 
these survive five years or more (SBA, 2016). Lazear (2004) claimed that an entrepreneur 
is a ‘jack of all trades’, Harper (2008) posits that new ventures should be envisioned as 
‘agent-neutral’ organizations. The locus of control and decision making could thus be an 
individual or a team, this has led to a call by scholars to focus on team-level constructs and 
analyses (Harper, 2008). Research on aforementioned is relatively sparse in the prevalent 
entrepreneurship literature. It has been shown that team-founded ventures perform better 
than those founded by sole entrepreneurs (Chandler & Hanks, 1998; Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1990; Roberts, 1991). However, academic understanding of team level 
constructs and their impact on performance is still missing many fundamental pieces.  
Interest in new venture survival is growing (Cefis & Marsili, 2006; Geroski, Mata, 
& Portugal, 2010; Gimmon & Levie, 2010; Helfat & Lieberman, 2002; Klapper & 
Richmond, 2011; Mata & Portugal, 1994). The antecedents related to venture success are 
likely different from antecedents of new venture survival (Dahl & Sorenson, 2012; Short, 
Ketchen, Palmer, & Hult, 2007). Past research has shown that similar industry work 
experience of the sole/primary owner is positively correlated with new venture survival 
                                                 
6 The author acknowledges the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation and the NORC Data Enclave for 
providing researcher support and access to the data used in this research. 
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(Dahl & Reichstein, 2007; Klepper & Sleeper, 2005). Does this relationship also hold when 
one looks at similar work experience of the team of owners? I argue that similar a 
relationship should be observed for a team owners. Furthermore, for educational attainment 
most past studies either focus on the number of years of education or the degree attained 
by the sole/primary owner, but these constructs may signify different aspects of learning 
and capabilities of individuals. Prior research treats them as close substitutes, however I 
posit that a degree may reflect intangible characteristics of the individual or a “sheepskin 
effect” or signal quality, and these aspects might be correlated with new venture survival 
rather than higher level of education. Thus, I empirically investigate whether survival 
differs when education is measured in different ways. 
Team performance is impacted by diversity both of tangible and intangible 
characteristics associated with teams (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 
1990; Joshi & Roh, 2009; Kilduff, Angelmar, & Mehra, 2000). Research on diversity has 
been growing at a fast rate (Harrison & Klein, 2007), but, research on diversity in owner 
teams and how it impacts new venture survival is very limited (Davidsson & Wiklund, 
2001; Lyon, Lumpkin, & Dess, 2000). New ventures have to continuously face varied 
challenges originating from markets, new technologies and evolving business processes. 
Compared to an individual, a team may be better equipped to handle these uncertainties 
(Vesper, 1990). A team may bring in more quantum of knowledge and a more diverse set 
of perspectives to resolve an issue. Hence, it is important to study diversity in teams and 
how it impacts new venture survival. In the organizational context findings about diversity 
have been inconsistent and ambivalent (Harrison, Price, & Bell, 1998; Pitcher & Smith, 
2001; Webber & Donahue, 2001). 
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Team composition is suggested to be important for team effectiveness (Bantel & 
Jackson, 1989; Wanous & Youtz, 1986). Heterogeneous teams may result in improved 
creativity and innovativeness (Sethi, Smith, & Park, 2002). Diverse teams are suggested to 
be more effective in solving complex, idiosyncratic problems (Gladstein, 1984; Kulik, 
Oldham, & Hackman, 1987; Wanous & Youtz, 1986) and these are the kinds of problems 
faced by new ventures. However, a recent study by Chowdhury (2005) analyzes 
demographic diversity of teams and finds no relationship between performance and 
demographic diversity (age, gender and functional work experience). Team heterogeneity 
may lead to friction and conflict resulting in bad performance. Homophily is associated 
with more satisfaction in communication with team members, lower levels of intra-team 
conflict (Pearce & Ravlin, 1987) and lower turnover (Jackson et al., 1991). Thus, diversity 
may hinder team performance.  
Harrison and Klein (2007) attribute the mixed results in diversity research to 
ambiguous and imprecise definition of diversity as a construct. They propose a typology 
of diversity, which deconstructs it into three categories – separation, variety and disparity.  
Each typology has its dominant logic but they may coexist. In the current article, I focus 
on utilizing this typology to assess the impact of diversity in owner teams on new venture 
survival. I specifically focus on diversity on two tangible dimensions – education and work 
experience in the same industry. These variables have been shown to impact new venture 
performance and hence understanding how diversity of the owner team along these 
variables would impact new venture performance is a logical next step.  
Furthermore, past research has implicitly assumed a monotonic relationship between 
diversity and performance, which needs to be investigated. This is especially true in the 
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context of the Harrison and Klein (2007) diversity framework where multiple diversity 
logics can co-exist leading to non-monotonicity. It is also possible that different levels of 
within group diversity have different effects on the outcome variables. Thus, this study also 
explores the non-monotonic effects of diversity on survival. 
The results of the current study have significant implications for research and 
practice. Echoing past studies, I find that same industry work experience increases the 
probability of survival of a new venture. The results of educational attainment of the 
owners are interesting – average years of education does not seem to be correlated with 
survival but degrees do. This result hints at the fact that intangible characteristics or the 
sheepskin degree effect or signaling effects of a degree may be important for venture 
survival. Focusing on the results of diversity of the owner team in education, I find that 
diversity decreases the survival probability of new ventures. However, I find that same 
industry work experience diversity does not impact survival. Future entrepreneurship 
research should focus on understanding under what situations does team diversity benefit 
survival? Research into whether it is diversity that is not helpful or the fact that new 
ventures are not organized to benefit from the diversity would have far reaching 
implications on policy and academic research. Finally, I find broad support for non-
monotonicity of the educational diversity and venture survival relationship. Moderate 
levels of diversity in education is much worse than low or high levels of diversity. It seems 
to indicate that costs at moderate levels of diversity far outweigh the benefits. 
The availability of confidential Kauffman Firm Survey data, which tracks a sample 
of new ventures started in the US in 2004 and follows them up to 2011, makes a detailed 
panel analysis of venture survival possible. The panel nature of the data lends itself to 
 50 
survival analysis and the extensive variables captured in the survey help in controlling for 
various kinds of unobserved heterogeneity. Finally, since KFS ventures are a representative 
sample of new ventures started in the US in 2004, these results are broadly applicable to a 
typical new venture. 
 The paper is organized as follows – the next section draws out theories that link 
independent variables to new venture survival. Two variables – owners’ educational 
attainment and owners’ same industry work experience are analyzed. Owners’ age, 
education, the size of the venture amongst others have been controlled for in the analyses. 
The theory section is followed by an explanation of data, variables, and methods. I report 
the findings in the results section. Finally, the paper ends with conclusion and discussion 
of the results. 
 Theory 
3.2.1 Background 
Analysis of individual level characteristics of the (primary) owner and their 
correlation with survival of new ventures has received considerable attention, but analysis 
of team level characteristics and their impact on new ventures has started to receive more 
attention only recently (Chowdhury, 2005; Delmar & Shane, 2006). In the following 
sections, I first argue that characteristics such as same industry work experience and 
education of the sole/primary owner are crucial for the continuation of a new venture and 
should also be important for new venture success in the team level context as well (Section 
2.1). I then conjecture about how the diversity of team members’ education and work 
experience in the same industry would impact new venture survival. Furthermore I debate, 
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if diversity is correlated with survival, whether the relationship should be non-monotonic 
(Section 2.2). I pursue an exploratory approach since there is limited extant evidence on 
team level constructs and their impact on new venture survival. 
3.2.2 Role of Owner Team Work Experience in the Same Industry and Team Education 
on New Venture Survival 
I argue that the effect of work experience in the same industry would be similar on 
the survival of a new venture whether it is measured for the primary/sole owner or as a 
team level construct. Further, previous studies find that education of the primary/sole 
owner impacts performance of a new venture. I investigate whether it is the years of 
education or the degree attained that is correlated with survival. 
3.2.2.1 Work experience in the same industry 
Work experience in the same industry as the current startup of the owners should 
lead to a positive effect on the outcome of the venture (Agarwal, Echambadi, Franco, & 
Sarkar, 2004; Dahl & Reichstein, 2007; Klepper & Sleeper, 2005). Delmar and Shane 
(2006) use a two year panel to show that industry experience of the owners positively 
effects performance of new Swedish firms and similar effects have also been found on the 
growth of new technology-based ventures in Italy (Colombo & Grilli, 2005). Working in 
an industry leads to the development of industry specific networks and contacts with 
vendors and buyers. When an employee starts a venture in the same industry, she can 
leverage these networks and contacts to improve the prospects of her venture. Work 
experience in an industry also leads to the development of tacit knowledge about the 
industry and the markets. Tacit knowledge is tough to imitate and rare to acquire (Mahoney 
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& Pandian, 1992) over short periods of time (Dierickx & Cool, 1989), hence leading to a 
sustainable competitive advantage for the startups whose owners possess it. Industry 
experience also provides an ‘intuition’ about profitable niches in an industry (Brüderl, 
Preisendörfer, & Ziegler, 1992). Specific industry experience leads to a better 
understanding of what is required to satisfy consumers in an industry (Knight, 1921; Von 
Mises & Mayes, 1990). Prior similar industry experience should also allow individuals to 
better understand the changes occurring in the customers, vendors, and other stakeholders, 
which should lead to a faster and more dynamic response to such changes resulting in the 
enhancement of prospects of survival of the new venture.   
This leads to an explorative empirical question – Would same industry work 
experience of the owner operators impact the chances of survival of a new venture? 
3.2.2.2 Education 
Higher level of education of the sole/primary owner is associated with higher 
survival rates of new ventures (Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon, & Woo, 1994). A team of 
founders can be thought of as a ‘unit’ working towards a common goal. Thus, the average 
level of education of the ‘unit’ should impact the venture survival in a similar way as would 
the education of the sole/primary owner.  
Higher levels of education could be correlated with higher rates of survival of 
ventures due to the primary effect of education which is a reflection of the knowledge of 
the owners. Past studies usually find a small but positive effect of years of education on 
new venture performance (Colombo & Grilli, 2005; Cooper et al., 1994). Success in 
entrepreneurship has also been associated with personality traits such as need for 
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achievement, generalized self-efficacy, autonomy, persistence, determination, stress 
tolerance, and proactive personality (Caird, 1993; Kickul & Gundry, 2002; Rauch & Frese, 
2007). The years of education is a direct measure of knowledge acquired whereas a degree 
may indicate other intangible characteristics (as discussed above), beyond knowledge 
acquisition, which may be related to venture survival. A degree holder may also benefit 
from the “sheepskin effect” (Jaeger & Page, 1996) – this effect posits that a person with a 
diploma would earn more than another person without one, but same years of education. I 
extend the logic to the context of new ventures and argue that a degree might open more 
doors and avenues of employment for an individual, thus increasing her opportunity cost 
of entering into entrepreneurship. It is known that unemployment rates vary across level of 
education with lower unemployment observed as the level of education increases 
(Ashenfelter & Ham, 1979). Thus, one might find more “necessity entrepreneurship” 
among owners with lower levels of education compared to individuals with higher levels 
of education.  This could also lead to a selection bias wherein better quality ideas or 
ventures are pursued by degree holders (“choice based entrepreneurs”) compared to those 
without a degree (“necessity entrepreneurs”), thus leading to better survival of ventures 
owned by degree holders. However, necessity entrepreneurs may “stick it out” longer in a 
business since they do not have any other option (Gimeno et. al., 1997).  
Furthermore, new ventures do not have a credible track record, thus resource 
providers and employees seek out signals of quality before committing resources to a 
venture. Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels (1999) and Vanacker and Forbes (2016) find that 
association with established players increases the credibility of startups. The completion of 
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a degree is another such quality signal which could allay the fears of resource providers 
and employees.  
As evident from the discussion above, there seems to be an inherent tension 
regarding education of the owner team and survival, which lends itself to an empirical 
analysis. Hence, I investigate the research question – whether survival of new ventures is 
correlated with the level of education or the years of education attained? 
3.2.3 Diversity and New Venture Survival 
Teams are becoming an integral part of organizations and new ventures. Teams 
comprise individuals with varying skills, characteristics, and backgrounds, thus, studies in 
diversity and how it impacts performance have proliferated in the last couple of decades 
(Chowdhury, 2005; Harrison & Klein, 2007; Watson et al., 2003). However, the findings 
about the outcomes due to within unit diversity have been weak and inconsistent (Harrison 
& Klein, 2007; Webber & Donahue, 2001). Harrison and Klein (2007) propose that these 
inconsistencies are a result of imprecise definitions of and hence improper 
operationalization of diversity constructs. Harrison and Klein (2007) divide diversity into 
three broad categories – separation, variety and disparity. Separation alludes to differences 
in opinions, and attitudes; variety pertains to the different categories of a variable and 
finally, disparity pertains to the differential accumulation of socially valuable assets or 
resources by team members. Each of these types of diversity have their dominant logic, 
however they are not mutually exclusive. Depending on the context one type of diversity 
may bolster or undermine another type. In the following, I utilize the typology of Harrison 
and Klein to develop arguments about how diversity in work experience and education 
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would impact new venture survival. I further conjecture about the shape of the relationship, 
given the interactions of the various diversity types. I posit that this should lead to a non-
monotonic relationship. 
3.2.3.1 Diversity in Same Industry Work Experience 
Work experience in the same industry can be classified as a “disparity” diversity. 
Harrison and Klein (2007) define disparity as differences in concentration of valued social 
assets or resources among unit members. As discussed in section 2.1, work experience in 
the same industry is an important resource for a new venture. The unequal distribution of 
valuable resources within organizations is common, however there are very few studies 
that analyze the impact of such diversity on outcomes. Bloom (1999) studied pay diversity 
and reported that such diversity leads to negative outcomes for organizations. Similar 
negative outcomes have also been reported by Eisenhardt and Bourgeois (1988) for top 
management team decision making.   
Following a similar logic to Harrison and Klein (2007), I posit that disparity in same 
industry work experience may lead to the poor survival probability of a venture. Watson et 
al. (2003) also hypothesized a similar relationship between differences in work experience 
and perceptions of owners about the growth and performance of their ventures. However, 
they did not find an empirically significant relationship. Disparity if not tempered with 
open communication may lead to a suppression of the voice of the junior members. Junior 
members may feel fearful of being ‘exposed’ due to their lack of knowledge and hence 
may not speak up, which in turn might lead to a loss of good ideas and insights for the 
betterment of the venture (Hollander, 1958; Pfeffer & Davis-Blake, 1990). Team members 
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with more experience might try to assert their authority over junior members, and the latter 
might focus on rebuffing such advances, leading to distractions from important tasks. 
Furthermore, previous research has found that high powered members may be involved in 
behaviour such as interrupting more, and speaking over people (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & 
Anderson, 2003) which might be detrimental to the efficient operation of a venture. These 
issues become especially salient in the context of new ventures, since they possess a very 
thin cushion for a mistake or misstep.  
Harrison and Klein (2007) point out that diversity effects may be interdependent 
and the various types of diversity may co-occur, thus impacting results and outcomes. 
Above I have argued that the primary channel through which same industry experience 
operates is that of disparity thus leading to negative outcomes. However, in the current 
context disparity may be coexisting with variety (characterized by a unit comprising 
different kinds of relevant knowledge). Prior industry experience can be categorized into 
low, medium and high levels, in such a scenario, the individuals with high levels of 
experience might bring ‘tried and tested’ robust approaches to solve problems facing a 
venture whereas as members with low experience may bring new and innovative, ‘out of 
the box’ solutions. Thus, as reported in past studies variety may increase the breadth of 
cognition of a unit (Argote & Ingram, 2000; Austin, 2003; McGrath, Berdahl, & Arrow, 
1995).   
Furthermore, Harrison and Klein (2007) hypothesize that moderate levels of variety 
may lead to problems of “unshared information” (Gruenfeld, Mannix, Williams, & Neale, 
1996; Morrison & Milliken, 2000; Stasser, Vaughan, & Stewart, 2000) which could lead 
to ‘siloed’ decision making, thus hampering performance. Thus, we might observe a 
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relationship between similar industry work experience and survival which changes 
direction depending on whether disparity or variety based forces dominate at various levels 
of diversity or the relationship may not be observed at all due to both the effects canceling 
each other out at each level of diversity. 
The discussion above leads to the set of questions – Does diversity in work 
experience impact new venture survival? If yes, is the relationship non-monotonic? 
3.2.3.2 Diversity in Education Levels 
Past studies have focused on how functional education such as in technology, 
business, finance etc. impacts new venture performance (Colombo & Grilli, 2005). Others 
have investigated the level of education such as high school, a bachelor’s degree (Cooper 
et al., 1994) and its impact on performance. In a team context owners may possess different 
levels of education. This diversity may impact the performance of a new venture. I 
conjecture that there are variety, disparity and separation diversity constructs interacting in 
such a context (Harrison & Klein, 2007). Variety increases the repertoire of mental models 
to tap into for solutions (McGrath et al., 1995). Individuals with say a high school education 
may have more ‘hands on’ and practical experience whereas a person with a PhD in a field 
may bring more intellectual and analytical rigor to a decision. Thus, such individuals will 
most probably travel differing career paths which will afford them different experiences. 
Furthermore, the attitudes about say innovation or towards work will be divergent across 
individuals with different levels of education. I posit that difference in educational levels 
would shape individuals who are qualitatively different from each other. Harrison and 
Klein (2007) state about variety … teams can translate greater information richness within 
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a unit into better choices, plans, or products. Thus, diversity in level of education should 
help new venture survival. However, the benefits of variety should be enhanced in a context 
where ventures encounter complex and new challenges with higher frequencies which is 
usually the case in high technology and innovative industries. New ventures in the US are 
mostly non-innovative and in stable mature industries (Hurst & Pugsley, 2011), thus this 
benefit of educational variety may be muted for most new ventures. 
Difference in education levels can also be envisioned as disparity diversity, since a 
PhD degree will mostly be rated higher in educational attainment than an individual with 
less than high school education. As discussed earlier, disparity may lead to worse 
performance due to the various issues associated with such diversity. More educated 
members may view themselves as superior and the less educated might develop an 
inferiority complex, both of these would detract from open communication thus hurting a 
venture’s survival. Disparity in the educational context may also foster the negative aspects 
of separation diversity (defined as composition of differences in position or opinion among 
unit members, primarily of value, belief, or attitude (Harrison & Klein, 2007)). For 
example more educated members of an owner team may hold very different opinions about 
the vision and mission of the venture compared to the views of the lesser educated 
members. For instance the former may focus more on the sustainability and ‘green’ aspects 
of the business whereas the latter may focus more on profitability. Dissonance amongst 
team members on such aspects of a venture may lead to sub optimal performance (McGrath 
et al., 1995).   
It has been found that effects of high and low levels of diversity may be different 
from those at moderate levels (Harrison & Klein, 2007). For example high variety may 
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lead to unique and new viewpoints (Gibson & Vermeulen, 2003) (assuming smooth 
information flow and members not withholding viewpoints). Similarly, moderately 
disparate teams may conform more readily to norms than high or low disparate teams 
(Harrison & Klein, 2007). In the current context, moderate levels of educational diversity 
may enhance the negative aspects of diversity since there would be more contention 
amongst members to assert their viewpoints and superiority, whereas in low education 
diversity teams all members may think and act alike. Finally, in high diversity teams 
individuals may implicitly know and accept their roles such as a PhD is responsible for the 
data analyses and strategy - “brains” of the venture whereas a high school dropout may be 
the “brawn” behind it, thus leading to each group working in their own “specialties” and 
in fact collaborating since there is no contention. Thus, it is important to investigate 
whether the relationship between diversity in education and survival is non-monotonic. 
The above discussion leads to the following set of empirical investigations - Does 
diversity in education impact new venture survival? If yes, is the relationship non-
monotonic? 
 Data and Methods 
3.3.1 Data Sources, Sample and Econometric Models 
The current study requires fine-grained panel data about new ventures and their 
owners. The Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS) is a relevant dataset for the study, since it is a 
longitudinal dataset of new ventures. The KFS started with an initial sample of 250,000 
firms, provided by D&B, which started in 2004 in the US (fifty states and the District of 
Columbia). A business was defined as started in 2004 if it was a new independent business 
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created by an individual or team, or purchase of an existing business or the purchase of a 
franchise (Robb & Robinson, 2012). Businesses that paid state unemployment insurance, 
or Federal Social Security tax or had an EIN or had schedule C income prior to or after 
2004 were excluded. Out of this sample, 4,928 firms were admitted with an oversampling 
of high-tech firms, weights have been provided by KFS in order to make the sample 
representative of all new ventures in the economy. These firms were surveyed annually in 
detail from 2004 to 2011, creating an eight-year panel. Firms which dropped out of the 
survey were not used in the regression models. This led to a total of 3140 firms and 18,286 
firm year observations. Amongst this sample records that were missing data or reported no 
owner operators or total size were excluded from the models, leading to 17,658 firm year 
observations. The data have information on up to 10 owners, initially and later 15 owners, 
which includes age, gender, race, ethnicity, education, and previous experience. Detailed 
financial information about the ventures, location, revenues, expenses, number of 
employees, profit/loss, and industry classification, among many other firm-level variables 
are also available in the dataset. 
 Cox survival analysis was used in most of the regression models. Linear Probability 
Models were employed to compute confidence intervals for curvilinear relationships of 
diversity and survival. 
3.3.2 Variables 
The performance of a new venture can be measured on multiple dimensions, I use 
survival as the dependent variable. The survival of new ventures will be measured as the 
number of years a new venture remains in business as an independent entity, with ventures 
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surviving till the end of the observation period (2011) as censored. Work experience in the 
same industry, was calculated as the average number of years of same industry work 
experience of the owner team. Education years are the average years of education of the 
owner team. Degree of Education is the proportion of owners with a particular educational 
attainment (for example less than high school, bachelor’s etc.) in a team.  
Coefficient of Variation Work Experience, measures the owner team diversity in 
similar industry work experience. Coefficient of Variation Education, measures the within 
owner team diversity in education. The measure captures diversity from the perspective of 
disparity (Harrison & Klein, 2007). The formula computing Coefficient of Variation (CV) 
is: 
CV = σ/μ 
where σ represents standard deviation µ represents the mean for the team. The standard 
deviation is measuring within unit diversity and not a population value, hence the 
denominator of the standard deviation contains n and not n-1. The CV captures the 
asymmetry in distribution of the resource which is pivotal to operationalizing the concept 
of disparity diversity (Harrison & Klein, 2007). CV captures the distance between unit 
members (through standard deviation). The mean accounts for relative level of the resource 
(Sørensen, 2002), for example a standard deviation of $40K in income of a unit with 
average income of $200K would be assessed as low disparity compared to the same 
standard deviation with average income of $60K. 
Blau Index Degree captures the within owner team diversity in education, measured 
with the lens of variety diversity (Harrison & Klein, 2007). 
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B = 1 − ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅1 i2 
where pi represents the proportion of unit members in the ith category. When members of 
a unit are qualitatively different rather than quantitatively, the Blau Index is an appropriate 
measure for diversity (Harrison & Klein, 2007). Blau Index traces its roots to Simpson 
(1949), who used it to measure species diversity in an ecosystem, it is also known as the 
Herfindahl (1950) and Hirschman (1964) index. Blau index captures the chance that two 
randomly selected unit members belong to dissimilar categories, which helps 
operationalize the idea that dissimilar members tap into varied information and other 
sources, hence operationalizing the variety disparity construct. 
A detailed list of the independent variables used in the study is provided in Table 
3-1. The KFS contains a wealth of information about the owners and the ventures 
themselves. This makes the use of multiple control variables possible. In order to manage 
unobserved heterogeneity, the following controls will be used – proportions of US citizen 
and gender of founders, the average age of the team, technology level of the venture, 
dummies for whether venture provides a product or a service, size of founder teams, and 






Table 3-1: Description of variables 
 
Variable Description 
MAIN VARIABLES  
Average Work Exp (Same 
Ind)(yrs) 
Average years of same industry work experience of active founder team (in years) 
Avg Education (yrs) Average years of education of the active founder team (in years) 
Ed., HS or less, Some Clg etc. Proportion of owners of the active founder team with various levels of education: 1. 
High school graduate or less 2. Technical trade or vocational degree 3. Some college, 
but no degree 4. Associate's degree 5. Bachelor's degree 6. Some graduate school but 
no degree 7. Master's degree 8. Professional School or Doctorate 
Coeff. of Var. - WE Coefficient of variance for years of work experience in the same industry for the 
active founder team 
Coeff. of Var – Ed. (yrs) Coefficient of variance for years of education of the active founder team 
Educ Blau Coeff Blau Index for education 
CONTROL AND MISC. VARIABLES 
Provides Product Business activity of the business is provision of product/s (Yes = 1) 
Provides Service Business activity of the business is provision of service/s (Yes = 1) 
Average Age (yrs) Average age of the active founders of the venture 
Hi Tech Business Dummy, 1= Yes if venture categorized as high tech (categorization done by KFS)+ 
Medium Tech Business Dummy, 1= Yes if venture categorized as medium tech (categorization done by KFS)+ 
Low Tech Business Dummy, 1= Yes if venture categorized as low tech (categorization done by KFS)+ 
Prop US Cit. Proportion of US citizens amongst the founder team ( 1 = US citizen) 
Prop Male Proportion of males amongst the founders (1 = male) 
Prop Am. Indian Proportion of American Indians in founder team 
Prop Asian Proportion of Asians in founder team 
Prop Black Proportion of Blacks in founder team 
Prop Pac. Islndr Proportion of Pacific Islanders in founder team 
Prop Othr. Race Proportion of Other Races in founder team 
Prop White Proportion of Whites in founder team 
Tot Size Sum of active owners and employees (Full time and part time) of a venture 
Tot Act Fndrs Total active founders 
 
+ Based on SIC classification developed by Bureau of Labor Statistics researchers. on Hadlock 
et al.  






Summary statistics of the variables are provided in Table 3-2 (due to disclosure 
constraints correlations, maxima and minima values have been omitted). The average same 
industry work experience of the owner operator team is 11.5 years. Most owner operators 
have at least some college education. Only 2% of the ventures are categorized as high 
technology, whereas 85% are low technology thus, most of the business ventures are ‘run 
of the mill’ non-innovative businesses. Finally, the size and number of owner operators 
reflect the fact that most new ventures are small with 1.4 owner operators on average and 












Table 3-2: Descriptive statistics of variables in econometric models 
 Mean S.D. N 
Life 5.57 2.70 3140 
Average Work Exp 
(Same Ind) (yrs) 
11.45 9.98 3137 
Coeff. of Var. - WE 0.13 0.30 3134 
Avg Education (yrs) 14.68 2.94 3134 
Coeff. of Var – Ed. (yrs) 0.02 0.08 3134 
Ln Coeff. of Var – Ed. 
(yrs) 
0.02 0.06 3104 
Educ Blau Coeff 0.10 0.20 3139 
Ed., HS or less 0.15 0.34 3139 
Ed., Technical 0.07 0.24 3139 
Ed., Some Clg 0.22 0.39 3139 
Ed., Associate 0.09 0.27 3139 
Ed., Bachelors 0.25 0.41 3139 
Ed., Some Grad 0.05 0.21 3139 
Ed., Masters 0.12 0.30 3139 
Ed., PhDs/Prof. 0.05 0.20 3139 
Average Age 44.80 10.38 3136 
Hi Tech Business 0.02 0.13 3140 
Medium Tech Business 0.13 0.34 3140 
Low Tech Business 0.85 0.36 3140 
Provides Product 0.51 0.50 3140 
Provides Service 0.86 0.35 3140 
Prop US Cit. 0.97 0.16 3139 
Prop Male 0.68 0.42 3140 
Prop Am. Indian 0.01 0.09 3136 
Prop Asian 0.03 0.16 3136 
Prop Black 0.08 0.27 3136 
Prop Pac. Isldr. 0.01 0.07 3136 
Prop Otr. Race 0.04 0.19 3136 
Prop White 0.83 0.37 3136 
Tot Act Fndrs 1.38 0.70 3140 
Tot Size 3.12 5.26 3069 
Log Tot Size 0.70 0.79 3069 
 
Relationships between variables were examined by starting with a basic model in 
Table 3-3, which included controls and average work experience in the same industry. As 
expected an increase in same industry work experience of the team leads to a decrease in 
the probability of failure. Failure is coded as 1, hence a negative coefficient implies 
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decrease in failure or better chances of survival. Interestingly, the average years of 
education of the team do not seem to impact survival, however degrees do have a 
significant impact on survival. This result supports my argument that degree attainment 
could represent intangible characteristics of the entrepreneurs, or a sheepskin effect or a 
combination of such factors. Unfortunately, due to data limitations I am unable to identify 
the contributions by each effect. As a post hoc analyses, when years of education and 
degrees are incorporated in the same model, I find that degrees still impact survival 
positively whereas average years of education is detrimental to survival. This result 
supports the view that degrees have an effect above and beyond the years of education and 
controlling for degrees attained, individuals who take more years in degree attainment are 
associated with higher business failures. This seems plausible since individuals who take 
more time to complete a degree on average may possess lower abilities than those who 
finish on time, and lower abilities may be related with either lower quality ideas or worse 
management of a business which would both lead to lower survival rates on average. The 








Table 3-3: Work Experience, Average Education and Degree of Education 
 Work Exp Work Exp & Edu 
(yrs) 
Work Exp & 
Degree 
 coef/std err coef/std err coef/std err 
Average Work Exp (Same Ind) -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Avg Education  0.000  
  (0.01)  
Ed., Technical   -0.191 
   (0.17) 
Ed., Some Clg   -0.174 
   (0.12) 
Ed., Associate   -0.147 
   (0.15) 
Ed., Bachelors   -0.266* 
   (0.12) 
Ed., Some Grad   -0.547** 
   (0.19) 
Ed., Masters   -0.372** 
   (0.14) 
Ed., PhDs/Prof.   -0.503* 
   (0.20) 
Average Age 0.003 0.003 0.004 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Provides Product -0.071 -0.071 -0.088 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Provides Service -0.198 -0.198 -0.211* 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Hi Tech Business -0.248* -0.248* -0.215* 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Medium Tech Business -0.255** -0.256** -0.188* 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Prop US Cit. -0.134 -0.134 -0.149 
 (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) 
Prop Male -0.000 -0.000 -0.011 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Tot Act Fndrs -0.047 -0.047 -0.042 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Tot Size -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Prop Am. Indian 0.280 0.280 0.243 
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) 
Prop Asian -0.612* -0.612* -0.536 
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) 
Prop Black 0.197 0.197 0.198 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Prop Pac. Isldr. 0.352 0.352 0.323 
 (0.54) (0.54) (0.55) 
Prop Otr. Race 0.166 0.166 0.174 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Number of observations 17658 17658 17658 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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In Table 3-4 we find that the Coefficient of Variance of years of work experience 
in the same industry is insignificant. This suggests that diversity in work experience either 
does not correlate with survival or the positive and negative aspects of diversity cancel 
each other out. The Coefficient of Variance for years of education is statistically significant 
and same is the case for Blau Index. However, educational diversity increases the 
probability of failure in both cases. This supports the idea that the effects of disparity 
diversity (negative effects) are overwhelming the effects of variety diversity (positive 
effects). Finally, when squared terms of educational diversity measures are included in the 
regressions Table 3-5, I find that both linear terms are still significant in both the Survival 
or LPM models. The squared terms are significant in the Linear Probability Models at or 
below 10% levels except for the Blau squared coefficient which is significant at 12.7% 
level in the survival model. The signs of the linear and squared terms are opposite thus 
indicating that a non-monotonic relationship exists between survival and diversity. This 
could be the result of say disparity diversity having different effects at low, medium and 
high levels or it could be that disparity diversity overwhelms variety diversity at some 
levels but not all or it could be a combination of the two factors. Figures 3-1 and 3-2 graph 
the confidence intervals with respect to survival for diversity. A non-monotonic 
relationship can be observed in both the Coefficient of Variance and Blau Index graphs. 
Most observations of the Coefficient of Variance for education fall below 1.0 
(approximately 45 observations are above 1.0) and a non-linear relationship with an 
inflection point before 1.0 can be observed from the graphs.   
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Table 3-4: Diversity - Work Experience, Degree of Education and Average 
Education 
 Work Exp Div Edu Div - Blau Edu Div - CV 
 coef/std err coef/std err coef/std err 
Coeff. of Var. - WE 0.189   
 (0.14)   
Educ Blau Coeff  0.530*  
  (0.21)  
Coeff. of Var – Ed   1.182*** 
   (0.30) 
Average Work Exp (Same Ind) -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Avg Education   -0.002 
   (0.01) 
Ed., Technical -0.195 -0.201  
 (0.17) (0.17)  
Ed., Some Clg -0.168 -0.176  
 (0.13) (0.13)  
Ed., Associate -0.137 -0.148  
 (0.15) (0.15)  
Ed., Bachelors -0.264* -0.263*  
 (0.12) (0.12)  
Ed., Some Grad -0.542** -0.553**  
 (0.19) (0.19)  
Ed., Masters -0.368* -0.371*  
 (0.14) (0.14)  
Ed., PhDs/Prof. -0.499* -0.499*  
 (0.20) (0.20)  
Controls included? Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 17658 17658 17658 








Table 3-5: Diversity - Non Linear: Degree of Education and Average Education 
 Edu Div 
Nonlinear - 
Cox 






Edu Div CV 
Nonlinear - 
LPM 
 coef/std err coef/std err coef/std err coef/std err 
Educ Blau Coeff 2.420+  0.161*  
 (1.26)  (0.08)  
Educ Blau Coeff Sq -3.639  -0.260+  
 (2.40)  (0.14)  
Coeff. of Var – Ed  3.146**  0.168** 
  (0.99)  (0.06) 
Coeff. of Var – Ed Sq  -3.043*  -0.104+ 
  (1.44)  (0.06) 
Average Work Exp (Same Ind) -0.016** -0.015** -0.001** -0.001** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Avg Education  -0.006  -0.000 
  (0.01)  (0.00) 
Ed., Technical -0.202  -0.005  
 (0.17)  (0.01)  
Ed., Some Clg -0.179  -0.004  
 (0.13)  (0.01)  
Ed., Associate -0.147  -0.002  
 (0.15)  (0.01)  
Ed., Bachelors -0.263*  -0.011  
 (0.12)  (0.01)  
Ed., Some Grad -0.552**  -0.030*  
 (0.19)  (0.01)  
Ed., Masters -0.367*  -0.017+  
 (0.14)  (0.01)  
Ed., PhDs/Prof. -0.491*  -0.023+  
 (0.20)  (0.01)  
Controls included? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies   Yes Yes 
Number of observations 17658 17658 17658 17658 





























































 Conclusion and Discussion  
In this paper, I investigated whether team level characteristics of the owner operator 
team impact survival. I use the confidential Kauffman Firm Survey to show that same 
industry work experience positively impacts survival. For educational achievement, it is 
important to understand whether it is the direct effect of education or other aspects above 
and beyond education which lead to better performance of a venture. I find support for the 
idea that the degrees attained by the owner operator team matter and not the years of 
education. Finally, diversity in education levels increases the chances of failure of a venture 
but, diversity in same industry work experience does not seem to correlate with survival.   
The above results provide insights for two strands of literature. First, past research 
has investigated how educational attainment impacts new venture performance. I further 
this work, by analyzing whether it is the average years of education or the degrees attained 
by the owner team. This dichotomy helps surface an underlying argument on education. I 
find degrees attained impact survival thus indicating the effect of characteristics of owners 
associated with educational attainment or signaling power of a degree or sheepskin effects 
or a combination of such phenomenon. However, I am unable to parse out the contribution 
by each phenomenon separately, due to limitations of data. Future research could focus on 
understanding the effects of these phenomenon in isolation. Further, future research could 
also assess contingency conditions under which the effects are pronounced or subdued. 
Another potential avenue of interest could be understanding the mediating role of 
characteristics such as self-efficacy, autonomy, persistence etc. in the education and 
venture survival relationship.  
 73 
My results also contribute to the broader literature of diversity. I utilize the typology 
developed by (Harrison & Klein, 2007) to assess the impact of diversity in education and 
similar industry work experience of the owner team on new venture performance. I find 
that education diversity viewed as disparity plays a more dominant role compared to variety 
diversity at the average levels. However, these results change depending on the level of 
diversity. These results are an extension to those found by (Chowdhury, 2005) who finds 
that gender, age and functional diversity are not important for entrepreneurial team 
effectiveness. In a similar vein, I find that similar work experience diversity does not 
impact venture survival. Furthermore, Watson et. al., (2003), found that perceptions about 
success of the ventures are not correlated with differences in partners (founders) in terms 
of education and work experience. However, I find that the perceptions about performance 
and the actual outcomes converge with respect to similar industry work experience 
however, they diverge for educational diversity perceptions. This finding implies that 
psychological perceptions of the interviewees may not always be a gauge of the actual 
outcome, where possible perception based findings should be checked with actual 
outcomes. This also points to a potential avenue for future research about why there is a 
gap between the perceived outcome and the actual outcome – is it due to the choice of 
outcome variables, a gap due to biases etc. between perceptions and outcomes or some 
other reason.  
As with most other empirical studies, this study too has limitations. The new ventures 
under consideration were started in 2004 while there does not seem to be any major shock 
to the economic ecosystem in that year, the results would be more robust if ventures of 
different vintages could be analyzed. This would require future data collection efforts to 
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develop datasets across vintages of new ventures. Secondly, diversity may be 
endogenously related to the quality of the idea of a venture. For instance, if an experienced 
engineer thought of a novel product idea, which was of high quality, he might be able to 
attract engineers and other professionals of similar caliber as him. On the other hand, the 
same engineer may have to make do with lesser experienced professionals if the latter 
believe that the idea does not have strong business potential. Furthermore, individual-level 
heterogeneity in unobservables such as strong leadership quality may impact the diversity 
of teams differently. These analyses are potential topics for future research if new datasets 
could incorporate the ‘soft’ characteristics of the venture such as quality of the idea and 
owners such as leadership ability, and interpersonal skills more fine-grained analyses could 
be conducted. 
However, in spite of these limitations, this study has important implications for 
entrepreneurs and investors. Investors and entrepreneurs may improve the chances of 
survival of their ventures if they fund or team up with others who have experience in the 
industry and have attained degrees rather than attended school without completing the 
level. Diversity in same industry work experience may not be a crucial criteria when 
developing the founding team. However, a venture team may be better off with low or high 
levels of educational diversity rather than moderate levels, thus, it might be better for the 
prospects of a venture to have a founder team comprising a PhD and a high school graduate 
rather than two owners with a master’s degree. Similarly, investors may want to focus their 
resources on supporting low or high educationally diverse teams. I hope that these results 
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CHAPTER 4. GENDER DIFFERENCES AND NEW VENTURE 
PERFORMANCE7 
 Introduction 
Females are entering the workforce in ever increasing numbers and the inequality in 
pay has also been declining over the past few decades (ILO, 2017), similar trends have 
been observed in business ownership by women (American Express OPEN, 2016). Fields 
such as management, professional and related occupations now employ more female than 
male workers and females comprise 47% of the US workforce (US Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, 2015). However, only 38% of businesses in the US are owned by females (US 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2015). Most large sample studies comparing male and female-
owned ventures have found that female-owned ventures perform worse on measures of 
survival, revenues and income (Fairlie & Robb, 2009; Kalleberg & Leicht, 1991; Robb, 
2002; Rosa, Carter, & Hamilton, 1996). However, Robb and Watson (2012) show that if 
adequate controls are used there is no difference in performance between the two 
categories.  
In the current study, I analyze whether there is a gap in performance between male 
and female-owned ventures, this is pertinent for targeted policy intervention. If there is 
indeed a gap, then the causes of the gap need to be identified and addressed through 
appropriate programs. On the other hand, if no gap is found, it should lead to further 
investigation of why there is no gap? Are female and male-owned ventures similar in 
                                                 
7 The author acknowledges the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation and the NORC Data Enclave for 
providing researcher support and access to the data used in this research. 
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characteristics which leads to similar performance or are they different but lead to similar 
results, since some characteristics support better performance by females and others by 
males and these effects cancel each other out. An assessment along these lines could be 
informative for policy makers in deciding how to enhance the participation of women and 
success of women-owned ventures.  
Previous studies posit that work experience, education and startup capital may be 
important factors in explaining the gender performance gap. Fairlie and Robb (2009) use 
the Characteristics of Business Owners dataset to assess some of these factors. I extend this 
line of research by studying more variables both at the owner team and venture level that 
have been associated with venture performance and survival. I use the confidential 
Kauffman Firm Survey, an eight year panel study of new ventures started in 2004.  
I utilize Logit and OLS regressions, followed by decomposition analysis to assess 
the contribution of individual variables in explaining the gender performance gap. I find 
that if adequate controls are used there is no gap in performance between male and female-
owned ventures. Decomposition analysis shows that certain variables are correlated with 
the performance gap. Similar to past studies, work experience in a similar industry is 
important in explaining a part of the gap. I also find that differences in average hours 
worked and technology levels of a venture lead to a performance gap. The incorporation 
status of the venture impacts revenues vs survival and net profits in different ways.  
In the next section, I provide theoretical underpinnings for the variables that I 
consider for decomposition analyses. In section 4.3, I explain the data sample and the 
decomposition methodology. In section 4.4, I discuss results and in section 4.5, I explain 
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the various robustness checks and discuss endogeneity concerns. Finally, in section 4.6, I 
discuss the implications of the research. 
 Theory 
4.2.1 Background 
Considerable prior research has been conducted to examine gender based firm 
performance gaps (Bosma, Van Praag, Thurik, & De Wit, 2004; Fairlie & Robb, 2009; 
Fasci & Valdez, 1998; Honig, 1998; Loscocco, Robinson, Hall, & Allen, 1991; Robb, 
2002; Rosa et al., 1996). Most studies focus on outcomes such as survival, revenues and 
profits. There is in this literature a general consensus that female-owned ventures 
underperform male-owned ventures. However, there are exceptions such as Kalnins & 
Williams (2014), who find that in certain contexts female-owned ventures may last longer 
than male-owned ventures.  
 Studies have also found that female-owned ventures are smaller on average 
compared to male-owned ventures (Cliff, 1998; Sabarwal & Terrell, 2008). Robb and 
Watson (2012) argue that the omission of firm age, size, scale, and owner risk and 
demographic controls may have led to the performance gap. Similar to the current study, 
they also used the Kauffman Firm Survey dataset, but utilized a shorter panel to show that 
when controls are used the performance gap disappears. In this paper, I investigate whether 
male and female-owned ventures differ on observables, and if they do, how the differences 
impact the performance gap. Fairlie and Robb (2009) have done similar work using 
decomposition analysis, using the Characteristics of Business Owners database from the 
Census Bureau, which  comprises two cross sections from 1992 – 1996. In the current 
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work, I use the Kauffman Firm Survey, which is an 8 year panel. Thus, an important 
difference is that I am able to control for the age of the venture. Robb and Watson (2012) 
argue that using this variable changes the results substantially (most prior studies usually 
find women owned ventures performing worse than male-owned but Robb and Watson 
(2012) find that there is no difference). I am also able to utilize different variables such as 
sole proprietorship, technology level of the company, usage of technology etc. Furthermore 
KFS affords more granular variables such as actual profits. Thus, the current study adds to 
the previous work by Fairlie and Robb (2009). 
Using an exploratory approach, I first outline the various owner and venture-level 
characteristics that have been associated with venture performance and survival. I then 
propose to investigate whether male and female-owned ventures differ significantly on 
these variables. Finally, I will analyse whether these differences lead to a differential in 
performance. 
4.2.2 Owner-level characteristics 
4.2.2.1 Prior industry work experience 
Bosma et al. (2004), Klepper and Sleeper (2005) and Dahl and Reichstein (2007) 
report that past industry experience positively impacts new venture survival, revenues and 
profits. Becker’s theory of human capital (Becker, 1964) proposes that specific investments 
are justified only when the benefits far outweigh the costs of making those investments. 
Industry specific work experience has a higher probability of being inimitable since 
exclusive investments have to be made in order to develop such a resource, hence it should 
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also lead to above average returns. Thus, I investigate the role of this variable on 
performance gap between male and female-owned ventures. 
4.2.2.2 Average education / degree earned 
In a meta-analysis of the impact of education on new venture performance Van Der 
Sluis, Van Praag, & Vijverberg (2008) found that education has a positive impact on 
performance. It may be associated with the ability to solve problems, skills that are useful 
for running a start-up and other characteristics such as self-confidence, motivation and 
discipline which may be associated with better performance (Cooper et al., 1994). Higher 
levels of education may also provide a signal of quality about the venture thus, resource 
providers may be more amenable to providing resources to ventures of better educated 
owners (Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999; Vanacker & Forbes, 2016). Given the above 
arguments, I have incorporated education levels in the analyses. 
4.2.2.3 Average hours worked 
Recent research has highlighted the strong and complex relationship between the 
business and family life of the entrepreneurs. The work-family interface literature suggests 
that achieving and maintaining a balance between business and family life is of prime 
importance to both male and female venture owners. Jennings and McDougald (2007) state 
that women are still typecast as the primary caregivers and nurturers of the family, and 
therefore there is a high probability that they will be able to devote less time to 
entrepreneurship than their male counterparts. Hours spent at work on a new venture could 
help in its survival and performance since more time would lead to benefits such as being 
able to keep the ‘shop’ open for more time, more time to network and lower costs since a 
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hired replacement will not be required to operate the business. Thus, it is important to study 
how a gap in hours worked impacts new venture performance. 
4.2.3 Venture-level characteristics 
While, owner characteristics are important in understanding the performance gap, 
there are other venture level characteristics which are known to impact new venture 
performance. In the following text, I explain some important variables which will be 
investigated for their contribution to the gender performance gap. 
4.2.3.1 Sole Proprietorship 
Kalleberg and Leicht (1991) suggest that incorporation is beneficial for the survival 
of a venture since incorporation lends the business an institutional identity and thus affords 
a business, relative financial and legal security against dissolution. However, owners of 
unincorporated businesses may manage their businesses better since losses could involve 
material impact on their personal financial well-being. On the other hand, incorporation 
may be correlated with multiple owners who may bring varied and diverse skills and 
networks to the table, thus enhancing revenues and profits. The decision to incorporate may 
also be impacted by the expectations of future growth of the business by the 
entrepreneur(s). Thus, it may be challenging to interpret the results causally. Given these 
counter logics and past research which proposes that incorporation status is an important 
variable to study to understand performance, I explore its ramifications in this study. 
4.2.3.2 Home based 
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Two important views are prevalent in the literature on where to locate a venture – 
the first one focuses on businesses deciding based on the least cost alternative and the 
second approach focuses on the quality of life and infrastructure of the area (Blair & 
Premus, 1987). As discussed above, women are perceived as primary caregivers in the 
family, thus women may choose to locate their ventures in the home or closer, which may 
not be optimal for a business. Thus, it is important to understand how location impacts the 
performance gap. 
4.2.3.3 Technology level of the venture and technology usage by the venture (Website 
and Email) 
The role of IT and technology in new venture performance has been increasing over 
the past few decades. Ventures associated with new and cutting edge technology should be 
more volatile in their performance. New technologies are uncharted waters for the ventures 
and the consumers, if the technologies are value accretive and ‘catch on’ it may lead to a 
significant upside for the ventures. On the other hand if the technologies fade out so would 
the ventures working on them. Similarly, the use of IT tools such as a website and email 
address should lead to enhanced sales through the web and would also send a positive 
signal to the consumers and resource providers that the business is ‘dynamic’. Hence, I 
include the technology level of the venture and usage of technology by the venture in my 
analysis. 
4.2.3.4 Age of the venture 
Stinchcombe and March (1965) propose that nascent firms suffer from liability of 
newness. Early in their life, new ventures have not developed processes and roles to deal 
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with negative circumstances and situations. Freeman, Carroll and Hannan (1983) 
empirically show that younger firms in industries such as semiconductors and newspapers, 
have a higher propensity to fail while they learn about their industry and gain management 
capabilities. Thus, it is important that age of the venture be considered in performance 
analyses, incidentally since all the ventures in the dataset are from the same cohort, no 
explicit variable is used to control for the age and neither its effects can be separated out in 
this study. One could argue that performance outcomes might differ between males and 
females depending on the age of the venture, for example females might enter business 
venturing as a lifestyle business and hence may continue to support businesses with low 
profits which may not be the case for men. Thus, we might find higher business survival 
and lower profits for female owned ventures compared to male owned ventures. 
4.2.3.5 Total size 
Cliff (1998) and Sabarwal and Terrell (2008) report that female-owned ventures are 
smaller in size compared to male-owned ventures. Gibrat’s Law asserted that firm size and 
firm growth are independent. However, empirical reviews of the literature conducted by 
Sutton (1997) and Geroski (1995) assert that firm size and survival are not independent. 
Furthermore, Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1989) find that smaller firms are more 
profitable and bigger firms have a higher probability of survival. Given these arguments, I 
incorporate the size of a venture in my analysis. 
4.2.3.6 Number of owner operators 
The number of owner operators may impact a business over and above the total 
size, since owners have more of a vested interest in the performance of a venture compared 
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to employees.  More owners could bring more cumulative experience to deal with adverse 
problems and situations and different ideas to grow the business. A venture would also 
benefit from the different expertise the owners would bring to the table. More owners may 
also bring in more social networks which would again benefit pivotal aspects of running a 
business such as raising capital, sales etc. On the other hand, too many owners may lead to 
‘diseconomies of scale’ and conflict. Thus, number of owner operators are also considered 
in the analyses. 
 Data and Methods 
4.3.1 Data 
The confidential longitudinal Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS) of new ventures has 
been utilized for the analyses. The initial sample contained 250,000 US firms which were 
started in 2004. The list was provided by D&B, and comprised ventures from fifty states 
and the District of Columbia. A business was defined as started in 2004 if it was a new 
independent business created by an individual or team, or purchase of an existing business 
or the purchase of a franchise (Robb & Robinson, 2012). Businesses that paid state 
unemployment insurance, or Federal Social Security tax or had an EIN or had schedule C 
income prior to or after 2004 were excluded. Out of this sample, 4,928 firms were admitted 
with an oversampling of high-tech firms; weights have been provided by KFS in order to 
make the sample representative of all new ventures in the economy. These firms were 
surveyed annually in detail from 2004 to 2011, creating an eight-year panel. Firms which 
dropped out of the survey were not used in the regression models. Thus, there were 3,140 
firms in 2004 which had completed the survey each year till the end of the survey period 
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or ceased to exist as independent entities. Out of these, I considered firms that had a 
majority of either female or male owners which led to 2,756 firms (firms with equal number 
of male and female owners were discarded). Revenue, profit and some other data such as 
total size were missing for some firms in some years (the revenues and profits are leading 
hence, 2004 revenue and profit observations were not utilized, also firms sometimes did 
not report the revenue and profit for the partial year in which they exited). Thus, the 2,756 
firms generated 15,013 firm-year observations for survival, 12,041 for revenues and 11,753 
for net profits analyses.  
The data have information on up to 10 owners, initially and later 15 owners, which 
includes age, gender, race, ethnicity, education, and previous experience. Detailed financial 
information about the ventures, location, revenues, expenses, number of employees, 
profit/loss, and industry classification, among many other firm-level variables are also 
available in the dataset. OLS and decomposition analyses were utilized to analyse the 
relationships between outcomes and predictor variables. 
4.3.2 Blinder Oaxaca Decomposition and OLS analysis 
In the current study, I propose to understand how much of the mean gap in outcomes 
can be explained by the variation in observable characteristics in between two groups. 
Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) developed a seminal approach to separate the total gap 
in the outcome variable into explained and unexplained components.  
 The “Blinder-Oaxaca” decomposition is based on two separate regressions for the 
groups. It decomposes the average difference in the outcome variable into “explained” 
differences, which can be attributed to group differences in observable productivity related 
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to characteristics such as work experience or education and “unexplained” differences 
which are effects due to discrimination and group differences on unobservable 
characteristics. Using the coefficients of ordinary least squares regressions for each group 
separately, the difference in mean outcome can be written as (Jann, 2008): 
Total Gap = G = E(YA) - E(YB) = E(XA)TβA - E(XB)TβB          ---------------------- (1) 
where E(YL) is the expected value of the outcome and E(XL) represents the vector of means 
of observable variables for group L (here A and B), and βL represents the vector of OLS 
coefficients for each group separately. 
 Equation 1 above, can be rewritten as under to express the contribution of 
independent variables to the difference in outcome variable as follows (Daymont & 
Andrisani, 1984; Jones & Kelley, 1984; Winsborough & Dickinson, 1971). 
G = {E(XA) - E(XB)}TβB + E(XB)T(βA - βB) + {E(XA) - E(XB)}T(βA - βB) ---- (2) 
 
The above expression is a “threefold decomposition”. The first expression, E on the RHS, 
represents the part of the Total Gap that is due to the average group differences of 
predictors, it is termed as the “endowment effect”. The second and third terms measure the 
differences due to coefficients and the interaction effects. The expression above utilizes the 
coefficients of group B to determine the endowment effects. I could also have expressed 
the above using the coefficients of group A as weights as well, in which case the equation 
would become: 
G = {E(XA) - E(XB)}TβA + E(XA)T(βA - βB) - {E(XA) - E(XB)}T(βA - βB) ---- (3) 
E C I 
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Another approach to combining the second and third parts of the equations above that is 
prevalent in the literature is as follows: 
G = {E(XA) - E(XB)}Tβ* + {E(XA)T(βA – β*) + E(XB)T(β* - βB)}     ------------ (4) 
 
where β* represents a non-discriminatory coefficient vector. The first expression, E, 
represents the “explained part” (also known as the quantity effect) and the next expression 
represents the unexplained part (which comprises discrimination and potential effects of 
unobserved variables). The previous literature proposes multiple approaches for 
calculating β*  such as Reimers (1983) who proposed a 50:50 weight for βA and βB  and 
Cotton (1988) who proposed weighting based on the sample size of groups A and B. 
Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) developed a generalized formula for β*  which subsumed the 
above approaches. 
G = {E(XA) - E(XB)}T{WβA + (I – W) βB} + {(I – W)T E(XA) + WT E(XB)}T(βA - βB)  
where W is the vector of weights, and I is an identity vector. Depending on the value of W, 
we could derive equations 2, 3, 4 above or other such related equations. Oaxaca and 
Ransom (1994) showed that W is given by the following equation when a pooled model 
over the two groups is used: 
West = Ω = (XATXA + XBTXB)-1 XATXA 
According to Elder, Goddeeris, and Haider (2010), the total unexplained decomposition 
gap corresponds to the coefficient of the dummy indicator of the group in an OLS 
regression. However, an issue with the above approaches, including Oaxaca and Ransom 
E U 
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(1994), is that it may overstate the explained part at the cost of the unexplained part (Elder 
et al., 2010; Jann, 2008). Thus, the summation of the Unexplained Pooled decomposition 
may be smaller in magnitude than the OLS coefficient of the dummy of the group indicator 
variable. Jann (2008) proposes that including a group indicator variable in the pooled 
model should address the bias issue. Furthermore, usually the pooled decomposition results 
of the unexplained part should lie between the values of unexplained decompositions for 
W = 0 or 1 (these could be used as references for upper and lower bounds). Finally, it may 
be informative to analyze the difference between the Total Unexplained Pooled Gap from 
the decomposition and the OLS Dummy coefficient, if the gap is small then probably the 
bias is also not significant. I employ all of the above methods in the data analyses to allay 
fears of bias. 
4.3.3 Variables 
4.3.3.1 Dependent Variables 
I use multiple measures of performance of new ventures: 
Survival – a venture was recorded as surviving each year it was in business as an 
independent entity. If the venture survived till the end of the survey period (year 2011) it 
was censored. In the data, failure is coded as 1 (to signify an event) and survival (status 
quo as 0). 
Log Total Revenues – are the logarithm of leading total revenues of a venture. For 
computational purposes $1 was added to the raw revenue numbers and then a log taken. 
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Log Net Profits – are the logarithm of leading net profits of a venture. Net profits can be 
zero, hence $1 was added to the absolute value of the net profits and then logarithms were 
taken. Finally, if the profits were negative, the above values were multiplied by -1. 
4.3.3.2 Independent Variables and Controls 
The KFS contains a wealth of information about the owners and the ventures themselves. 
This makes the use of multiple control variables possible. to manage unobserved 
heterogeneity.  
Gender Dummy – is an indicator variable representing the majority of owner operators of 
a venture. Ventures with a female majority of owner operators were coded as 0 and those 
with male majority were coded as 1. 
Average Same Industry Work Experience – The average work experience of the owner 
operator team in an industry similar to the current venture. 
Education level - Proportion of owners of the active founder team with various levels of 
education: 1. High school graduate or less 2. Technical trade or vocational degree 3. Some 
college, but no degree 4. Associate's degree 5. Bachelor's degree 6. Some graduate school 
but no degree 7. Master's degree 8. Professional School or Doctorate 
Product vs service - Multiple past studies suggest that industry may be playing a part in the 
gender performance gap of ventures (Anna, Chandler, Jansen, & Mero, 2000; Rosa et al., 
1996). The underlying logic of most of these studies is that women enter service industries 
relatively at a higher rate compared to men. Service industries require lesser startup capital 
but are also prone to closing faster (Hutchinson, Hutchinson, & Newcomer, 1938). Fairlie 
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and Robb (2009) find that industry is not a significant explanatory variable in the gender 
performance gap. Thus, I control for type of output of the business – service or product, 
provided by the business in the models.   
Sole Proprietor – is a dummy variable, coded as 1 if the venture is sole proprietorship and 
0 otherwise (includes limited liability corporation or partnerships etc.). 
Average Hours Worked by Owner/s – Number of hours worked on average by the owner 
operator team in a week. 
Owner age – Owner team age may impact industry experience (Delmar & Shane, 2006). 
Also, higher age may be associated with more maturity and experience in solving problems 
but may also be correlated with slower reaction times to problems by owners. Thus, I 
control for average owner team age. 
Hi, Medium and Low Technology – are indicator variables representing the technology 
level (type of employees, product) of a venture. The categorization was done by KFS based 
on SIC classification developed by Bureau of Labor Statistics (Hadlock, Hecker, & 
Gannon, 1991).  
US Citizenship – Oyelere and Belton (2013) show that citizenship matters in the context 
of self-employment in the US. Self-employed individuals who have a foreign root (parents 
are non US citizens, individuals themselves are non US born, were naturalized) seem on 
average to have higher self-employment rates. Hence, I control for citizenship in the study. 
Race – Multiple studies find that Black owned ventures perform worse than White owned 
ventures on multiple measures of performance (Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon, & Woo, 1994; 
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Robb, 2002; Sexton & Robinson, 1989). Hence, it is important to control for the racial 
composition of the owner operator team. 
Home Based – is an indicator variable coded as 0 if a venture is operating from a 
home/garage and 1 otherwise. 
Website and Email – are indicator variables, coded as 1 if the venture has its own 
website/email and 0 otherwise. 
Total active founders – is a count variable for the number of owners who are actively 
involved in the operations of the business. 
Log Total Employees – Log of sum of active owners and employees (full time and part 
time) of a venture. 
 Results 
Table 4-1 presents summary statistics of Male vs Female-owned ventures. The two 
categories are statistically different in average years of work experience in the same 
industry, levels of incorporation, average hours worked, proportion of ventures providing 
services, log total size, number of owner operators, and technology levels. Given earlier 
arguments about women being considered primary care givers in the household, it is 
intuitive that they work less hours and have less same industry experience than men. As 
pointed out by past research, (Cotton, 1988; Robb, 2002) I also find that women ventures 
are smaller in size. Women engage in less technology intensive ventures as well.  
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owned  Difference 
Standard 
Error T-stat N 
Log Total Revenues 7.563 8.227   -0.665 0.287 -2.318 2393 
Log Net Profit 1.265 1.796   -0.531 0.516 -1.030 2269 
Average Age 45.363 44.499   0.864 0.521 1.660 2752 
Average Work Exp 
(Same Ind) 9.437 12.850   -3.413 0.491 -6.955 2754 
Avg Education 6.215 6.045   0.170 0.102 1.670 2747 
Provides Product 0.536 0.493   0.043 0.026 1.677 2756 
Provides Service 0.808 0.879   -0.071 0.020 -3.618 2756 
Sole Proprietorship 0.537 0.362   0.176 0.025 6.896 2756 
Avg Hrs worked 39.903 42.124   -2.221 1.156 -1.920 2749 
Log Total Size 0.463 0.705   -0.242 0.037 -6.512 2676 
Number Owner 
Operators 1.161 1.317   -0.155 0.030 -5.198 2756 
Home Based 0.464 0.507   -0.043 0.026 -1.677 2756 
Website 0.402 0.413   -0.011 0.025 -0.429 2756 
Email 0.876 0.870   0.006 0.017 0.349 2756 
Hi Tech Business 0.009 0.022   -0.014 0.001 -10.342 2756 
Medium Tech Business 0.107 0.148   -0.041 0.007 -5.566 2756 










 Tables 4-2 and 4-3 report regressions for Survival (Linear Probability Model and 
Logit), Total Revenues and Net Profits. The Gender dummy coefficient is insignificant, in 
all three regressions echoing findings similar to Robb and Watson (2012). As conjectured 
by Robb and Watson (2012) controlling for the age of the venture (implicit since all 
ventures are from the same cohort) seems to be crucial in making the coefficient 
insignificant, as compared to studies such as Fairlie and Robb (2009) which find that 













Table 4-2: Pooled Regressions for Survival 
 Model 1: LPM Model 2: Logit 
 coef/std err coef/std err 
Gender Dummy -0.005 -0.130 
 (0.01) (0.09) 
Average Work Exp (Same Ind) -0.001*** -0.019*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) 
Edu., Technical -0.014 -0.272 
 (0.01) (0.21) 
Edu., Some Clg -0.012 -0.239 
 (0.01) (0.15) 
Edu., Associate -0.002 -0.093 
 (0.01) (0.18) 
Edu., Bachelors -0.013 -0.264 
 (0.01) (0.14) 
Edu., Some Grad -0.027* -0.491* 
 (0.01) (0.23) 
Edu., Masters -0.022 -0.412* 
 (0.01) (0.17) 
Edu., PhDs/Prof. -0.029* -0.551* 
 (0.01) (0.23) 
Avg. Age 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Provides Product -0.004 -0.106 
 (0.01) (0.09) 
Provides Service -0.015 -0.308* 
 (0.01) (0.12) 
Sole Proprietor -0.018** -0.324*** 
 (0.01) (0.09) 
Avg Hrs worked -0.000*** -0.009*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Hi Tech -0.011 -0.233 
 (0.01) (0.13) 
Medium Tech -0.011* -0.194* 
 (0.01) (0.10) 
Prop. US Cit. -0.015 -0.624** 
 (0.02) (0.19) 
Home Based 0.004 0.067 
 (0.01) (0.10) 
Website -0.016** -0.261** 
 (0.01) (0.09) 
Email -0.036** -0.525*** 
 (0.01) (0.13) 
Tot. Active Fndrs -0.002 -0.091 
 (0.00) (0.07) 
Log Total Employees -0.004 -0.043 
 (0.00) (0.06) 
Race Controls? Yes Yes 
Year Dummies? Yes Yes 
Number of observations 15013 15013 
R-sq 0.0159  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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 Table 4-3: Pooled Regressions for Revenues and Profits 
 Model 1: Log Total 
Revenues 
Model 2: Log 
Net Profits 
 coef/std err coef/std err 
Gender Dummy 0.228 0.603 
 (0.20) (0.39) 
Average Work Exp (Same Ind) 0.029*** 0.063*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) 
Edu., Technical -0.735 -1.677* 
 (0.41) (0.70) 
Edu., Some Clg -0.297 -0.905 
 (0.32) (0.62) 
Edu., Associate -0.278 -1.604* 
 (0.36) (0.73) 
Edu., Bachelors 0.340 0.029 
 (0.30) (0.58) 
Edu., Some Grad 0.119 -1.191 
 (0.37) (0.79) 
Edu., Masters 0.259 -0.352 
 (0.34) (0.68) 
Edu., PhDs/Prof. -0.321 0.194 
 (0.46) (0.87) 
Avg. Age -0.011 -0.059*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) 
Provides Product 0.422** -1.457*** 
 (0.15) (0.32) 
Provides Service 0.233 1.329** 
 (0.23) (0.48) 
Sole Proprietor -0.895*** 1.136** 
 (0.19) (0.35) 
Avg Hrs worked 0.038*** 0.031*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) 
Hi Tech 0.575** 0.479 
 (0.21) (0.52) 
Medium Tech 0.254 0.972** 
 (0.17) (0.36) 
Prop. US Cit. 0.703 0.197 
 (0.65) (1.19) 
Home Based 0.879*** 0.434 
 (0.19) (0.36) 
Website 0.622*** -0.469 
 (0.16) (0.34) 
Email 0.587* -0.030 
 (0.29) (0.53) 
Tot. Active Fndrs 0.086 -0.043 
 (0.12) (0.23) 
Log Total Employees 0.833*** -0.065 
 (0.10) (0.24) 
Race Controls? Yes Yes 
Year Dummies? Yes Yes 
Number of observations 12041 11753 
R-sq 0.2260 0.0533 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Tables 4-4 and 4-5 represent the decomposition analysis of survival, total revenues 
and net profits. It is worth noting that as mentioned by Elder et al. (2010) the coefficients 
of the Gender Dummy in the linear regressions, are very close to the unexplained gap in 
the Oaxaca decomposition models of survival, total revenues and net profits.  
The explained portion of the results can be evaluated in terms of how the variables 
impact the outcomes if the male-owned ventures’ characteristics were allocated to the 
female-owned ventures. Three groups of results can be identified – factors that help explain 
the explained gap between female and male-owned ventures, factors that have mixed 
effects explaining the gap for some outcome variables (for example survival) and not for 
others (say revenues and profits) and finally, the third group comprises factors that have 
close to zero point estimates and hence materially do not impact the gap.  
If the male-owned venture endowments were assigned to female-owned ventures, 
the variables in the first group would increase the survival chances, revenues and profits of 
the female-owned ventures (since as evident from the decomposition results male-owned 
ventures outperform female-owned ventures in the explained gap). A few variables in this 
group are significant and have high enough point estimates to explain significant portions 
of the explained gap. Work experience in the same industry accounts for 80% of the gap in 
survival, 12% in revenues and 47% in net profits. This makes intuitive sense since male 
owners on average possess more same industry work experience which in turn leads to 
better ability in managing and running a startup and hence, better performance. A similar 
explanation is valid for average hours worked by the owner team, which accounts for 20% 
to 40% of the gap. The analyses indicate that higher technology levels of ventures lead to 
better survival and performance for male ventures (technology explains 2% to 12% of the 
 103 
explained gap). I conjecture one of the explanations could be that operating a low 
technology business might be leading to more competition and hence, worse performance. 
The remaining set of variables in the group, such as providing service, average age of the 
owners, number of active founders, and number of employees possess point estimates 
which explain 1% to 23% of the explained gap, but are statistically not significant in all 
the specifications. It is possible that there is in fact no ‘true’ effect of these variables or it 
could be a limitation of the sample size of the data, hence this is an area of further 
investigation in future studies.  
The second group of variables provides mixed indications, some point estimates 
help explain the gap whereas others increase it. The interpretation of the sole proprietorship 
results is nuanced, for survival it accounts for 70% to 75% and for net profits 55% of the 
explained gap. However, the sign of the point estimate indicates that if women-owned 
ventures were to incorporate at similar levels as male-owned ventures, their survival and 
profits would worsen. However, for the revenues (20% of the explained gap), it aids in 
accounting for the gap. A possible explanation could be that sole proprietors are more 
heavily invested in their ventures, hence they put in extra effort in their ventures and this 
leads to the ventures surviving when an incorporated venture would have folded. Similarly, 
a proprietor may have a sharper focus on profits compared to an incorporated business 
since sole proprietors are personally liable for dues of a venture. However, incorporated 
ventures may be bigger in size (owners or employees) leading to more resources devoted 
to crucial activities such as sales, but as discussed above these extra revenues do not seem 
to necessarily imply higher profits. Other variables in this group such as home based 
ventures, education and venture providing a product, account for 1% to 13% of the 
 104 
explained gap but are not always statistically significant, as explained earlier this is an open 
avenue for future research. 
Finally, the third group of variables comprises website and email. Similar 
percentages of male and female-owned ventures owned a website and used email, and the 














Table 4-4: Survival Decomposition 
Fairlie Decomposition - 
Survival    Oaxaca Decomposition Analysis - LPM 
         




owned 3571    
Number Female-
owned 3571  
Number Male-owned 11442    
Number Male-
owned 11442  
  Coeff      Coeff T-stat  
Female-owned 0.0749    Female-owned 0.0749 13.2688  
Male-owned 0.0648    Male-owned 0.0648 21.1381  
Difference 0.0101    Difference 0.0101 1.5709  
Explained 0.0055    Explained 0.0052 2.3341  
     Unexplained 0.0049 0.7595  
         
         
  Coeff T-stat 
% of 
Explain






Average Work Exp 
(Same Ind) 0.0044 3.7959 81%  
Average Work 
Exp (Same Ind) 0.0041 3.5254 80% 
Education -0.0007 -0.9205 -13%  Education -0.0006 -0.7714 -11% 
Avg. Age 0.0004 0.9781 7%  Avg. Age 0.0002 0.7687 4% 
Provides Product -0.0003 -0.8161 -5%  Provides Product -0.0001 -0.4763 -1% 
Provides Service 0.0012 1.5775 23%  Provides Service 0.0009 1.4933 17% 
Sole Proprietor -0.0041 -2.8416 -75%  Sole Proprietor -0.0037 -2.7975 -71% 
Avg Hrs worked 0.0025 3.3079 46%  Avg Hrs worked 0.0021 2.7992 41% 
Race 0.0004 0.8514 7%  Race 0.0003 0.5793 6% 
Technology 0.0007 2.2920 12%  Technology 0.0006 2.1739 12% 
Prop. US Cit -0.0004 -0.8053 -8%  Prop. US Cit -0.0003 -0.7876 -6% 
Tot. Active Fndrs 0.0007 1.2490 13%  
Tot. Active 
Fndrs 0.0004 0.8542 8% 
Log Total Employees 0.0005 0.4164 10%  
Log Total 
Employees 0.0012 1.0222 22% 
Website 0.0001 0.2015 1%  Website 0.0001 0.2843 2% 
Email -0.0001 -0.6393 -2%  Email 0.0000 0.0315 0% 
Home Based -0.0003 -0.7580 -6%  Home Based -0.0003 -0.6590 -5% 
Time 0.0005 1.0490 9%  Time 0.0001 0.4204 2% 
TOTAL 
EXPLAINED 0.0055  100%  
TOTAL 
EXPLAINED 0.0052  100% 
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Table 4-5: Oaxaca Decomposition Analysis 
Total Revenues    Net Profits  
Total N 12041 
  
  11753 
  
Number Female-
owned 2809   2722 
Number Male-
owned 9232   9031 
  Coeff T-stat 
  
  Coeff T-stat 
  
Female-owned 8.3082 44.7269   1.8899 5.7694 
Male-owned 9.3984 85.1416   2.8912 14.6425 
Difference -1.0902 -5.0638   -1.0013 -2.6198 
Explained -0.8717 -6.6131   -0.3992 -2.5444 
Unexplained -0.2185 -1.1013   -0.6022 -1.5832 
Total Revenues - Explained Gap   Net Profits - Explained Gap 
 Coeff T-stat % Explained  Coeff T-stat 
% 
Explained 
Average Work Exp 
(Same Ind) -0.1037 -3.1403 12%   -0.1879 -2.8897 47% 
Education -0.0252 -0.9858 3%   -0.0805 -1.6495 20% 
Avg. Age -0.0086 -0.8927 1%   -0.0391 -1.0982 10% 
Provides Product 0.0045 0.3930 -1%   -0.0143 -0.3619 4% 
Provides Service -0.0129 -0.9668 1%   -0.0758 -2.0838 19% 
Sole Proprietor -0.1783 -3.9689 20%   0.2182 2.8987 -55% 
Avg Hrs worked -0.1660 -3.6816 19%   -0.1402 -2.9341 35% 
Race -0.0329 -0.6973 4%   -0.0264 -0.4308 7% 
Technology -0.0195 -2.1236 2%   -0.0492 -2.2579 12% 
Prop. US Cit 0.0147 1.0243 -2%   0.0047 0.1742 -1% 
Tot. Active Fndrs -0.0140 -0.8318 2%   0.0030 0.0915 -1% 
Log Total 
Employees -0.2699 -5.4770 31%   0.0199 0.2691 -5% 
Website -0.0023 -0.1366 0%   0.0001 0.0110 0% 
Email -0.0032 -0.4233 0%   0.0003 0.0732 0% 
Home Based -0.0526 -1.9041 6%   -0.0254 -1.0278 6% 
Time -0.0019 -0.1196 0%   -0.0065 -0.6682 2% 
TOTAL 
EXPLAINED -0.8717  100%  -0.3992  100% 
 
 
 Robustness and Endogeneity 
Fairlie and Robb (2009) found that industry does not explain a significant portion of 
the explained gap. Thus I used technology levels, product and service provided as 
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variables. However, I also conducted robustness checks including 2 digit NAICS code in 
regressions, since these industry effects may be correlated with technology levels these 
regressions had lower levels of significance of the technology variables. The story for all 
other variables was generally as described in the results. I also tested the boundary 
conditions of decomposition as per Elder et al. (2010) and found that the unexplained gap 
is between the two extremes of the male or female only reference models.  
 The results for total revenues and net profits might be impacted by selection bias 
since I can only observe the total profits and revenues for firms that are in business in a 
given year. I was unable to find instruments that are correlated with gender and 
uncorrelated with performance, so this remains a challenge for future research. It would 
entail collecting appropriate data so that selection bias concern could be mitigated. 
 Conclusion 
In this paper, I study whether there is a difference in performance between male and 
female-owned ventures. I find that no significant difference in performance exists between 
the two categories. However, summary statistics revealed that there are multiple variables 
on which male-owned ventures differ from female-owned ventures, four of which seem to 
be having a statistically significant and material impact in explaining the gap. These 
include same industry work experience of the owner team, number of hours worked by 
owner team, incorporation status and level of technology of the venture.  
 This study adds to a prior body of research on gender differences in new venture 
performance. Past studies usually found female ventures performing worse than male-
owned ventures, however more recent studies such as Robb and Watson (2012) find no 
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difference, arguing that using adequate controls leads to the disappearance of the 
performance gap between the categories. This study finds results similar to the more recent 
studies (it is worth noting that Robb, Watson, 2012 also used the same dataset but a smaller 
time frame of analysis). Thus, reinforcing the view that relevant controls play an important 
role in empirical studies of gender, and future research work should carefully collect and 
incorporate relevant controls in the analysis.  
 Most past studies in decomposition analysis usually do not reconcile the gap 
between regression analysis and decomposition results. It has been shown that the 
unexplained part of the total gap is equal to the regression coefficient in OLS (Elder et al., 
2010). In this study, I find support for the assertion. Another aspect of decomposition 
research has been the rare reporting of significance levels (Jann, 2008), I report these and 
draw conclusions based on both point estimates and significance.  
 The study has practical implications for policy makers and female entrepreneurs. 
The results indicate that women possess less prior industry work experience and work 
fewer hours per week. This leads to a performance deficit for their ventures. Thus it is 
important to understand how parity can be developed between male and female owners on 
these variables. Further research is required to understand what the reasons for the gap are. 
Is it an issue of mindset where women are ‘expected’ to work less and they ‘confirm’ to 
the bias, in such a scenario more focus is needed on changing the attitudes of society. 
Another issue could be that enough opportunities do not exist for women to gain prior 
industry work experience this may again be due to inherent biases in hiring or may be 
women do not possess appropriate skills to cater to the job requirements. Each of these 
situations will have different policy solutions. Similarly, women owners tend to work fewer 
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hours and it is important to conduct research on why this is the case? If it is due to 
expectations of performing household work then again attitudes in society need to be 
changed. However, if this is an infrastructural issue such as non-availability of enough day 
care facilities or they being expensive, then women might spend more time at home. The 
results about incorporation are another area where policy makers need to think carefully, 
women have a higher proportion of unincorporated ventures but this is better for survival 
and net profits however incorporation is better for sales (hence male-owned ventures are 
better off in sales). Thus, if the end goal is to grow the sales of ventures (for example when 
the country wants to expand, provide more jobs etc.) this might be better but, if the focus 
is on resource utilization it might be better to have unincorporated ventures. Finally, 
women owned ventures are lower tech than male-owned and this is correlated with worse 
performance of the former ventures. From a policy perspective it is important to understand 
whether women choose participation in low tech ventures or they are ‘forced’ to make such 
choices due to a deficit in skills and education. Finally, a potential area of further research 
could be boundary conditions for example this study was based on US data, are similar 
results observable in say Europe, Asia and the Middle East.  
 The study has certain limitations which also open up avenues for future research. 
The ventures are all from the 2004 cohort and from the US, a broader data collection effort 
across countries and containing ventures of various cohorts may lead to wider external 
validity. The regressions for total revenues and net profits may suffer from survival bias 
since it is not possible to observe the revenues and profits of ventures that ceased to exist. 
Future data collection efforts which collect data on instrumental variables or keep in mind 
causal methods such as coarsened matching techniques would be helpful in our 
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understanding of causality. Finally, the responses to surveys may vary depending on the 
gender of the person filling out the survey, this is a limitation of the current study and future 
studies could incorporate a proportional mix of men vs women respondents to address this 
limitation. 
 In spite of the limitations of the current study, it has far reaching implications for 
researchers and policy makers. It furthers our understanding of gender based venture 
performance differences and points to future fruitful avenues or research. It will also aid 
the policy makers in deciding the factors they need to focus on to enhance the performance 
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